THE NEW JAPANESE PERIL

BY

SIDNEY OSBORNE

Author of "The Problem of Japan" and "The Isolation of Japan"

New York

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1921

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THE NEW JAPANESE PERIL

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FOREWORD

THE following pages are intended to bring the discussion of the Japanese question, begun by the writer in *The Problem of Japan* (1918) and continued in *The Isolation of Japan* (1919), down to date.

While it is, perhaps, difficult for those who have made a study of Far Eastern questions to preserve a non-partisan and impartial attitude, particularly where, as in the present discussion, the future supremacy of the white races is shown to be endangered, the author has endeavoured to retain as objective a point of view as is consistent with his natural feelings as a member of the Western family of nations against whom the new Japanese peril may come to be directed.

The reader is warned that in presenting his views, as herein set forth, the author makes no claim to consistency in his treatment of various aspects of the subjects discussed. Such a thing as consistency would, in this relation, be impossible, for the reason that the writer endeavours to picture future developments from at least more than one standpoint. Particularly in his presentation of the problems and tendencies that are

involved in the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance, the author has attempted to discuss the probable consequences in relation to each turn of events and in conjunction with each new set of circumstances. For example, the question of whether Great Britain favours a renewal of the Treaty depends on world conditions which are changing, and what her ultimate decision in the matter will be depends on the world situation at the very moment she is called upon to make her choice. Similarly, Japan's attitude towards Britain depends upon factors which are constantly subject to change.

Accordingly, it has been the writer's purpose to pursue no dogmatic view of the probable course of events, but rather to present varying phases with their probable consequences, and, most important of all, to awaken new trains of thought in the reader's mind on this most important of subjects.

In order that there should be no menace to the peace of the world arising out of Japan's policy in the Far East, it would be necessary for her to reverse her policy and go in the opposite direction. Does anyone believe she will do it? If she will not, and continues to advance in the direction she is moving, then the Far Eastern question bids fair to grow into a menace that will include the whole world within its orbit.

Reliance on treaties there can be none, nor in the principle of peaceful development. The fight

of the peoples for freedom, democracy and the rights of nations has not yet been won. Those rights will still have to be defended in the Pacific.

Much encouragement has been derived by the writer in his present task out of the fact that many of the views expressed by him, in the former publications above referred to, have been justified by subsequent events. Indeed, the swiftness with which epoch-making transactions have followed upon one another has made the art of forecast an unusually difficult one. It is unfortunate that it is not possessed to a greater degree by the statesmen who now pretend to govern us. What is needed is some of the prescience of a Disraeli, who in 1879 wrote the Marquis of Salisbury a letter in which he gave utterance to the prediction, startling for that time, that England, under certain conditions, would some day be fighting by the side of Russia and France against the Central Powers. That was a long look ahead, and remarkable by reason of the fact that British policy had been particularly anti-Russian during Disraeli's premiership and so remained down to the *Entente* of 1907.

In this, the greatest crisis of affairs in history, Western civilization might yet be saved by a statesman with the genius and imagination of a Disraeli or a Lincoln. Some magic touch is needed to electrify the world—to convey to it an interpretation of the mysterious messages spoken

in an unknown tongue with which the entire atmosphere of the East is laden, and to make vivid, as a flash of lightning, the meaning of a distant and gathering sound that approaches with the steadiness and uniformity of a caravan moving in the solitary wastes of the desert—a sound of the measured tramp of feet and of the rumbling thunder of heavy guns.

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The New Japanese Peril

CHAPTER ONE

JAPAN DEVELOPS HER FAR EASTERN PROGRAMME

NOTHING could have been more opportune for Japan than the outbreak of the great European War. After having successfully fought two wars within a decade, whereby she had managed to assert in the one her superiority over another branch of the Yellow Race and in the other her ability to stand up against and finally vanquish, in one of the most sanguinary wars in history, a very prominent member of the European Concert of the white nations, Japan found herself a decade later still struggling painfully to overcome her most formidable handicap as a nation, namely, her financial situation as a debtor nation, with difficulty in making both ends meet and forced to ask new loans of Western creditors.

The fundamental problem for Japan had been to increase her imports above her exports. For in raw materials, having little coal and less iron,

the two elements upon which all modern industry chiefly rests, Japan's progress and expansion depended for a very large part upon her ability to control sufficiently large sources of these supplies.

Not having them at home, they must be sought upon the mainland. Rival nations must be prevented from anticipating Japan's wishes and thus staying her development.

The *first* step, therefore, was to secure a right to intervene in China, a right which some of the Western nations, with much less excuse, had already assumed for themselves, in defiance in some cases of China's assertion of her inalienable rights of sovereignty.

The *second* step was taken in the war with Russia, which was fought primarily to free Japan from the too close proximity of a formidable rival who might seize for herself the very things Japan so greatly coveted, and of which she had so much need.

Of a sudden, in August 1914, came the great boon for the Island Empire, still struggling to consolidate her position on the mainland, in Korea and Manchuria, and still intriguing to extend her privileges and claims over other domains of the Chinese, in the same manner as she had made Korea and South Manchuria subservient to her wishes. The European War seemed destined, in large measure, not only to solve Japan's pressing financial problems, but likewise to make easy,

while her Western rivals were engaged in butchering one another, Japan's intervention policies on the mainland.

The writer has already in two publications from his pen (*The Problem of Japan* and *The Isolation of Japan*) described the process by which Japan, during the course of the war, succeeded in attaining to a very large measure of her projected designs, namely, the hegemony of the Yellow Race and a controlling voice in the future destinies of the Far East. And yet the sudden ending of the war in November 1918, with the totally unexpected and unwished-for capitulation of the Central Powers, put Japan in a position that was not entirely free from embarrassment.

Japan's statesmen had reckoned that the war would end either in a draw or, at the very least, in an indecisive victory for the Western Powers which would leave Germany still master of her fate. In such an event it was felt that Japan's rôle at the ensuing Peace Conference would be almost that of an umpire, and that her prestige and influence would, in this fact, reach such a height that all resistance to her demands to control the future fate of China and the Far East would be lightly swept aside.

The lightning-like succession of events, however, which brought about the complete collapse of the Central Powers now threatened to upset entirely Japan's well-devised plans and even to

put her position as a Great Power to the proof, for England and America were now to be the dictators of the Peace, and between them possessed the argument of irresistible force and power with which to give weight to their wishes. Moreover each of these nations (too loyal to the European contest to engage themselves elsewhere) was smarting under the consciousness that they had upon more than one occasion been compelled to yield to the arrogant claims and demands of Japan in the Far East and to accept at her hands a policy which was in flagrant derogation of their own interests.

It would have been better for Japan had she remembered that Britain never forgets nor forgives a slight or trespass against her Imperial prestige. When the time comes to settle accounts, Japan will find that England has not forgotten how the Land of the Rising Sun took advantage of her engagements elsewhere to undermine her national and economic interests in China. Nor will England hesitate to remind Japan that she, Britain's ally, had permitted a bitter press campaign to be conducted against the British partner of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, at one of the most critical moments of the entire war, when the Allies were being violently attacked in the West and the Russians were falling back in the East (Verdun—first half of 1916). The check everywhere to the British arms—at Gallipoli, in Mesopotamia, and

in the naval battle at Jutland—came in for a severe scoring at the hands of the wily Nipponese, whereas the great achievements of the German arms were correspondingly exalted and the latter's spirit held to be above all praise. Indeed, a part of the Japanese press even went so far as to suggest that the time had at last come for Japan boldly to denounce the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, or at least to demand its revision. That these recriminations are not to be attributed to the emanations of merely irresponsible organs of public opinion, uncontrolled by the public authorities, is plain, for it is a fact that the newspapers in Japan, as in no other country, are entirely subservient to the Government, particularly when questions of foreign policy are mooted, and in this instance the press of the seat of Government, Tokio, with hardly an exception, joined in the hue and cry.

For many months this agitation continued, and only ceased when the danger of a German breakthrough at Verdun had been overcome and England once more felt herself strong enough to lodge a protest, in vigorous language, with Baron Ishii, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. That this was a serious attempt to bring about the abrogation of the Alliance when it had more than half of its duration yet to run and *in war-time*, in direct violation of the explicit terms of the Treaty, there can be no doubt. And what made

the thing especially galling to the British Imperialist was the fact that this Japanese agitation was a demonstration to the world that in the opinion of the Japanese the English were not doing particularly well in the war, and that therefore Japan could do better for herself in China if no agreement existed.

In reality, all of this agitation was put up as a screen to cover a bad case of troubled conscience. For, at the very time this press campaign against Japan's ally was going on, Japanese statesmen were negotiating a secret treaty with Russia, which was intended to, and does in effect, nullify the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. It will be remembered that the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance was first entered into in 1902, and renewed with modifications in 1905 and 1911, the last time for a period of ten years. The renewal in 1911 was for England no longer a matter of the far-reaching importance which the earlier agreements had possessed, for the reason that England had already, in 1907, come to an understanding with Russia over nearly all existing matters of difference, and from thenceforth directed her diplomacy towards checking the advance of Germany. Russia and France were no longer her antagonists in Asia and in Africa. Britain, that up to 1904 had been working hand-in-glove with Germany against France in Morocco and with Germany against Russia in Persia, now abandoned

her former associate, and in exchange for a free hand in Egypt, granted by France, and a sphere of influence in Persia, granted by Russia, composed all differences with Russia and France, and entered upon an entirely new diplomatic course which culminated in the outbreak of the great European War. The prior crisis in affairs in 1911, ending in a Conference of the Powers at Algeciras, and the two Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 were but preludes to the enactment of the much greater drama upon which the curtain was to rise in August 1914.

Now, then, the point we wish to make is that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was directed, so far as both England and Japan were concerned, against the aggressions of Russia in Asia. England feared for India and Japan feared for China and for her position of strength generally in the Far East. But after the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese position towards Russia rapidly changed, and they composed many of their differences and arranged a working partnership of the two nations in the Far East by the secret treaties of 1907, 1910, 1912. They had been driven into each other's arms primarily by the attitude of the United States towards the policy of the "Open Door" in China and particularly in Manchuria, where the former enemies, Russia and Japan, had mapped out "spheres of influence" for themselves along the lines of the South Manchurian

Railway to the harbours of Port Arthur and Dalny. In other words, Japan and Russia felt themselves compelled to display a united front against the insistent demands of the United States for the application of the policy of the "Open Door" and equal opportunities for trade in China and Manchuria.

In spite of Japan's growing enthusiasm for Russia, however, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was still a vital factor in world affairs at the time of the outbreak of the Great War, and so remained, even in the eyes of Japanese statesmen, down to the summer of 1916, when at last Japan began to feel herself strong enough to cut the painter that tied her to England and tie up to her new ally, Russia. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had been entered into for the purpose of putting a check on Russian aggression in Asia, was now to be replaced by the Russo-Japanese Alliance, which in effect declared China to be the concern of these two Powers, and of these two Powers alone. It was Japan's first great step in the direction of enforcing her new programme, so providentially favoured by the European War, of "Asia for the Asiatics." For Russia, like Japan, is a truly Asiatic Power, and is so regarded by all Asiatics. Japan's second and equally important step in the same direction was made when she succeeded, in 1917, in winning over the United States to the recognition of her "special interests" in China,

upon the occasion of the Baron Ishii mission to America.

With the right of the Asiatics to demand from Europeans and Americans that they accept such a programme (namely, "Asia for the Asiatics") we have no quarrel. It is solely a question of how the programme is to be carried out. If carried out in the same spirit and with the same high selflessness with which the United States applies the Monroe Doctrine to the Americas, then there is a great deal to be said for the doctrine of "Asia for the Asiatics"; but if the doctrine is carried out in the manner and spirit displayed by Japan towards all the world in China, Manchuria and Korea, and towards China in the matter of Japanese aggressions upon Chinese territorial integrity and China's sovereign rights as an independent nation, then the doctrine is an unjust and pernicious doctrine.

CHAPTER TWO

DEVELOPMENTS DOWN TO THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

It must be clear to every thinking American that the United States cannot, without stultifying itself and throwing overboard one of the most important planks in its foreign policy, permit Japan to apply the doctrine of "Asia for the Asiatics" in disregard and defiance of the principle of the "Open Door," first enunciated by John Hay as Secretary of State in 1899, and later accepted by the other Great Powers, including Japan, in various treaties entered into between those Powers and China and in sundry agreements entered into with one another. But it is greatly to be feared that this is precisely the course that Japan proposes to take in case the doctrine comes to be generally recognized, or rather, to express the matter more accurately, Japan will refuse to stop acting in disregard and defiance of the principle of the "Open Door" in the Far East. For in South Manchuria the "Open Door" has been a closed door for many years, due to the systematic exclu-

sion of all Western trade competition in this important Japanese sphere of influence.

Nor could the United States afford to stand at one side and permit Japan to assail and to violate the sovereignty of China, as she has done in the matter of the "twenty-one demands" presented to China on January 18, 1915, at a time when the other Great Powers had their hands tied by the European War and were unable to interfere.

Under these demands the land of the Mikado not only attempted to secure from the Chinese important politico-economic advantages in Shantung, South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, but it likewise set over against China such demands as, had they been granted, would have reduced China to the position of a vassal State, and would necessarily have put an end to any and every influence possessed by the Western Powers in the Far East.

Fortunately, diplomatic pressure, exerted in the nick of time by England and the United States, compelled the Government at Tokio to renounce, at least temporarily, some of its most far-reaching demands. The Japanese Government, nevertheless, could be well satisfied by the results attained, for it secured, after long negotiations, culminating with the ultimatum and threatened use of force of May 7, 1915, such advantages as placed it in a position practically to dictate the future development of China and her dependency upon Japan

in the more important essentials of her national life.

In the subsequent agreement that was signed between China and Japan on the 25th of May, Japan succeeded to the rights of Germany in Shantung and was allowed to have a free hand in South Manchuria. By these manœuvres Japan had managed to work out an encircling policy that included the capital, Peking, the province of Chili and all the sea approaches thereto, within its grasp, and an unassailable base from which to extend Japanese influence over further large tracts of China, including the command of the most important railways and waterways.

Following upon the imposition of the greater part of the "twenty-one demands" upon China, the Government at Tokio let no grass grow under its feet in its efforts further to consolidate its position. As already pointed out, Japan came to an understanding with Russia in 1916 as regards their future relations in China, and in 1917 Japan succeeded in bringing England and France into line with Russia, by means of secret treaties, which guaranteed to Japan the support of those countries with respect to her claims as successor to Germany in Shantung and the German islands north of the Equator.

Naturally, the participation of the United States in the World War, coming after her declaration of war against Germany in April 1917, pro-

vided Japan with an opportunity of still further extending her sway over the future destinies of China, for on the 2nd of November of that year Baron Ishii was able to convince the American Government that it was no longer in a position to refuse to recognize the paramount interests of Japan in the Far East, and accordingly, as already referred to in our first chapter, the famous Ishii-Lansing Agreement was signed, in which America undertakes to recognize Japan's "special interests" in China. By this act the United States formally, albeit in the camouflaged language of diplomacy, abrogated the hitherto (next to the Monroe Doctrine) most dearly prized plank of her foreign policy, for, in spite of all attempts subsequently to weaken the force of the concession, it surely must be conceded that the acknowledgment of special rights in one nation is totally inconsistent with the principle of the "Open Door" and equal opportunities for *all* nations. Most to be criticized about the transaction is the fact that it placed the United States, for the first time in its history, open to the charge of violating without provocation the sovereignty of China. For China had not been consulted in the matter at all, and it was China's sovereign rights as an independent nation that were the subject-matter of the Ishii-Lansing Agreement.

But the close of the war has changed many things, and it is not alone the Japanese who are

agitating themselves over the question: Will the United States continue to honour its signature to a document that departs so widely from the hitherto recognized principles of the American Government? Or are we to have furnished to us another example of the truism which has at one time or another been recognized by all governments, namely, that conditions may arise that make all agreements between governments mere "scraps of paper"?

In 1914, and within three months of the outbreak of hostilities, Japan had succeeded in expelling the Germans from Shantung and had established herself in the province so successfully that by the beginning of 1915 she was ready to move further to extend her control over China. In 1915 she had, by the "twenty-one demands," attained to a quasi-protectorate over China. In 1916 she had, by secret treaty, secured the adherence of Russia to her Chinese programme. In February–March 1917 she had, by secret treaties, bound England, France and Italy to the same end, and in November of the same year she had succeeded in committing the United States (as indicated above) in support of her designs.

And yet, with this record of stupendous achievement, almost without a parallel in history, the ambitious and clever statesmen of the Mikado did not rest satisfied. The war was not yet over, and there were still more fruits to be plucked.

Accordingly, in 1918, using the situation of the Czechs in Siberia as a pretext, Japan succeeded in enlisting the aid of England, America, France and Italy in an expedition to the mainland for the purpose, as it was alleged, of rescuing the Czechs from the Bolsheviki and the Germans, although the Bolsheviki were at that time entirely unorganized and, if anything, needed protection from the Czechs, and the nearest German troops were five thousand miles away. Of course, Japan had charge of the expedition and furnished the bulk of the troops. The others only gave colour to the undertaking. Because of Japan's paramount interests in the Far East and her geographical proximity, it could not have been otherwise.

To begin with, Japan dispatched 100,000 men to Siberia, which was just ten times as many as she had proposed to send when negotiating with the other Powers. But under the pretext that the Trans-Siberian Railway needed guarding and that her merchants and immigrants in Siberia required protection, Japan justified the sending of so large an army of Japanese troops. To be sure, it requires little political insight to realize that what Japan was really after was Vladivostok and Russia's Maritime Province, together with the expansion of Japanese influence as far west as the Baikal inland sea in South-eastern Siberia. It is, therefore, almost impossible to conceive what could have been the weighty material or moral

considerations that induced the statesmen of the Western nations, and particularly President Wilson, to enter upon the folly of this intervention.

With the settling of the Japanese in Eastern Siberia, the last stroke was given to the construction of the imposing edifice of stone upon stone, since the beginning of August 1914, for the purpose of attaining a Japanese hegemony in the Far East. There now remained to give permanency to the structure. It must be made unassailable. And to this end, after hostilities came to a swift close in November 1918, the Japanese directed their best efforts, realizing, however, that the unexpected and to them unwelcome collapse of the Central Powers had created a new and dangerous international situation, in which Japan ran great risk of finding herself utterly isolated, as against the solidarity and overwhelming physical superiority of the Western victors in the World War.

We shall leave the consideration of these new factors in the situation to the following chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

THREE FACTORS OF DANGER FOR JAPAN

For Japan, one of the dangers in the situation that arose after the cessation of hostilities was the question of what recognition the Powers, and particularly the United States, were going to accord China in return for the latter's participation in the war upon the invitation and advice of the Government at Washington.

Second in importance for the Island Empire, as a source of possible obstruction to its plans, was the idealistic programme of President Wilson, embodied in his Fourteen Points and in his efforts to establish a League of Nations.

A third menace for Japan lay in the possibility of an Anglo-Saxon alliance, comprising all the English-speaking nations, in which event England and America would be expected to adopt a common programme with respect to their interests in the Far East.

As regards the first factor in this new situation with which the Government at Tokio saw itself confronted, namely, the attitude of the Powers

towards China at the ensuing Peace Conference, Japan had already taken measures to protect herself when, as above pointed out, she secured the promise of England, France and Italy (Russia's consent had also been obtained, but prior to the Revolution) to support Japan at the Peace Conference in her designs to control Shantung and the German islands north of the Equator. The United States, alone of the Great Powers at war with Germany, had not given its assent to the Japanese programme, and it was just the United States that had taken the leading part in overcoming the opposition of Japan to China's entrance into the war on the side of the Allies.

Twice in 1915 that astute statesman, Yuan Shi Kai, President of the Chinese Republic, had sounded the Allies with respect to the possibility of China declaring war on Germany. Both times she was advised by Great Britain that her participation, however desirable from many standpoints, might result in serious complications elsewhere. Clearly enough, what was meant was that in the event of Japan not having her way in China, her defection from the Allied group was feared, and such a disaster was certainly not to be compensated by the adherence of China.

China had no quarrel with Germany. On the contrary, Germany, because of her almost faultless attitude towards China in the matter of

respecting Chinese rights and susceptibilities and the purely commercial character of her occupancy of Shantung (see the writings of Stanley Hornbeck and T. F. Millard), was better liked as a nation than any of the other Great Powers, with the possible exception of the United States.

Accordingly, it was with little enthusiasm that China made the offers above referred to. Her real enemy was Japan, and the problem was how to rescue a large and practically defenceless empire from the clutches of a ruthless and ambitious neighbour who was armed to the teeth. China saw her only hope in joining that one of the warring groups who would be both willing and able to afford her the necessary protection and be just to her in the settlement of her problems at the Peace Conference.

Japan, on the other hand, striving as she was to keep China weak and defenceless, an easy prey to her imperialistic designs, understood China's purpose only too well, and therefore embraced every means to frustrate it; and there is evidence that in 1916 Japan went so far in her opposition as seriously to contemplate a break with her allies and adherence to the cause of the Central Powers. And when the United States finally entered the war, after first breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany in February 1917, Japan hastened to secure the guarantees she felt she needed from her allies and without which her position in

China would be utterly shaken and insecure. She acted promptly, for she saw clearly what effect the entrance of the United States into the war would have upon the Chinese nation. For the Chinese regard America as entirely without selfish imperialistic aims in China, and therefore as a champion whose friendly sympathies could be relied on to do justice to China when the time came for the settlement of Chinese problems.

Accordingly, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, when asked for the third time to give his consent to the entrance of China into the war, replied by pulling out a drawer in his desk, in which lay a document which turned out, upon examination, to be the draft of an agreement in which England, France and Italy undertook to support the Japanese claims at the Peace Conference. The bland Japanese diplomat presented the same to the British Ambassador with the remark that he would be most happy to be of service, provided he got his agreement. And he got it. Failing to secure American adhesion to this document, Japanese resourcefulness sought other means to attain the same result, and accordingly the Baron Ishii mission was conceived, to proceed to America and win over "the Yankees." America yielded to pressure because she was enlisted whole-heartedly to go in and bring the European War to a close, and she could not afford to have an enemy on her right flank. Hence

the Ishii-Lansing Agreement, with its recognition of Japan's "special interests" in China.

The situation at the close of the war, however, was this: Whatever the Ishii-Lansing Agreement might mean—and there is a great difference of opinion about that—it was not to be expected that America would go the length of supporting the Japanese programme with respect to Shantung. Japan might have "special interests" in China, but that surely did not mean the right to swallow up whole provinces. And yet, for reasons which seem vague and unsatisfactory to the average intelligent follower of events, President Wilson was induced to support the secret treaties signed by England, France and Italy, which gave Japan control of Shantung. Secret treaties were supposed to be anathema to the President. And, indeed, the Treaty of London, which also undertook to dispose of provinces without the consent of the peoples or Governments concerned, has never received the sanction of the President, and he has put his refusal on the ground that it is a secret treaty entered into by his associates in the war who had failed to advise—much less consult—him in the matter. But if the Treaty of London is bad for that cause, the treaty disposing of Shantung is still worse, for the reason that the former was signed while America was still a neutral (April 26, 1915), whereas the latter was signed after America had decided to enter the

war, namely, after she had broken off relations with Germany.

We now come to the consideration of the Fourteen Points and the League of Nations, which seemed to be a menace to Japanese interests. Assuming that these ideals became realized, it meant an end of secret diplomacy, the nullification of all secret agreements, universal disarmament, government by the consent of the governed, representative government everywhere answerable to the people, an end of autocracies and oligarchies, and the introduction generally of a reign of justice and good will throughout the world. With such a programme even in prospect, Japan trembled for her not easily earned triumphs in Korea, in Manchuria, in Shantung and other provinces of China. Its realization meant the end of Japan's dream of hegemony in the Far East. It meant that the rest of the world would be leagued against her to maintain the independence and integrity of China and of Russia, whose Eastern Asiatic provinces Japan coveted.

Japan went to the Peace Conference and supported the proposition of a League of Nations with her tongue in her cheek, and then only after her territorial claims in China and elsewhere had been fully recognized. She would in no event have supported a real League of Nations, but she felt that she could afford to support the particular brand that was being offered at the Peace Con-

ference, because she saw that from the beginning to the very end of that Conference, and from the first to the last paragraph of the Covenant of the League of Nations adopted by the Conference, all the principles of a real League that would have been dangerous to Japan were thrown overboard. Thus, at the very outset, the Conference restored and even glorified the supposedly discredited principle of secret diplomacy. On the question of disarmament it uttered not a word that could cause disquietude to the smallest State that had imperialistic designs. Even the Prince of Monaco, with his "army" of fourteen constables, might safely disregard all that the Conference had to say on that subject. The principle of self-determination, had it possessed the proverbial nine lives of a cat, would have had all of them extinguished by the Conference. And what was there left of the democratic idea in the League upon whose Supreme Council sat, not representatives of the peoples, but representatives of Governments only, and whose decisions were subject to the veto of one single voice? Not to enunciate in detail all the other principles for which the Fourteen Points and the League were supposed to stand sponsor, it is enough to say that Japan sat grimly and silently by and saw every one of them violated and disregarded. Under such circumstances it is not astonishing that the Japanese diplomats returned home at the close of the Con-

ference with a smile upon their faces that resembled that of the famous tiger who took the lady from Niger out for a ride.

The third factor of danger above referred to which Japan had to be on her guard against was the much-mooted Anglo-Saxon hegemony of the world—America and England joining hands across the sea. There was much to be said for the realization of such an alliance. The two countries had common interests to protect in the Far East, America and some of the British Dominions had similar race problems to solve in connection with the opposition of their peoples to the admission of the yellow races as immigrants, both nations had Far Eastern possessions the security of which was menaced by the Japanese proclamation of a Monroe Doctrine for Asia, and lastly, Japan was fast reaching the position of industrial independence which would make her not only a formidable competitor in the world's markets, but a particularly dangerous adversary in the struggle for the markets of China.

But the idea of an Anglo-Saxon alliance suffered shipwreck on the rocks of Ireland. No Anglo-Saxon alliance can ever be consummated so long as the Irish problem persists in its long lease of life and remains an unsolved political puzzle for the British statesmen. There may be other factors that prevent such a consummation; but they are negligible by the side of the Irish one. The

British themselves are beginning to realize that this is so, for we find frequent references to it in those opposite extremes of British journalism, the London *Times* and the *Daily News*. Perhaps, with a growing menace of a Japanese or Yellow peril, if that should ever come, or with an actual menace to her interests in India before her eyes, Britain will consent to solve the Irish difficulty and include in the alliance Germany and even Russia. Indeed, we shall refer to this possibility in a subsequent chapter. For the present, Japan feels herself secure from the Anglo-Saxon menace.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLICIES OF JAPAN AND ENGLAND COMPARED

In the shaping of her foreign policy consequent upon the decisions to be taken at the Peace Conference, Japan had one final factor to consider in addition to those of which mention has already been made. And in the consideration of this final factor it will not be without advantage to examine the startling parallel that exists between the foreign policy of the Island Empire of Japan and the foreign policy of the Island Empire of the United Kingdom. Nor is it at all strange when we examine into the reasons for it that the foreign policies of these two nations, so widely divergent in race, culture, colour, religion and political history, run along similar lines.

As has so often before been pointed out by the present writer and by others, the geographical position of Japan towards the mainland of Asia is precisely the same as England's situation with respect to the mainland of Europe. Both nations have derived a great part of their power and strength from the fact of their insularity. In the

early days of her history England had several times suffered invasion. Firstly by the Romans and then successively by the Angles, Saxons, Danes and finally by the Normans or Northmen. The Romans obtained no permanent footing in Britain and finally withdrew. The Angles and the Saxons, on the other hand, established themselves and reigned for centuries, in conflict with the native Britons and the invading Danes. But civil war weakening the solidarity of Anglo-Saxon England, a third and decisive Danish conquest of a house divided against itself was accomplished by William the Conqueror. And when finally, after two centuries of internal strife, England emerged under Edward the First (the first sovereign since the Norman Conquest who bore an English name) as a united nation, English history begins to take on a fixed character as regards resistance to foreign invasion and by degrees the advantages of insularity are impressed upon the British nation. England becomes a great Maritime Power, dependent almost entirely upon her fleet for protection against invasion, and develops towards the continent of Europe a policy of creating a balance of power, setting off one strong nation or combination of nations against another strong nation or combination of nations and making the best and cleverest use of the prevalent continental jealousies to weaken a growing rival. Indeed, since the reign of Queen Elizabeth four formidable rivals

to British world supremacy have successively arisen—Spain, Holland, France, Germany—and all of them, by the masterfulness of British diplomacy, have been reduced to impotence. The writer speaks in no spirit of condemnation. The achievement is too great to be worthy of anything save admiration.

Japan, like England, although in a lesser degree, has suffered from invasions. There is, however, this distinctive difference between the two cases, namely, that Japan has always succeeded in repelling the would-be foreign conqueror. In A.D. 1019 the Sushen or Toi—ancestors of the Manchu—who in A.D. 549 had raided the island of Sado, off the west coast of the main island of Honshiu, had conquered the islands of Tsushima and Iki in the Korean straits, and effected a landing on the northern shores of Kiushiu. They had been driven off, and Iki and Tsushima had been reoccupied. In the following century the Mongol, Gengis Khan (1162–1227), had created a gigantic empire between the Dnieper and the Pacific Ocean, and his successors extended his conquests. One of them, the celebrated Kublai Khan, a grandson of Gengis, in 1263 subjugated Korea, which became his vassal kingdom. In 1264 he fixed the capital of his empire at Peking and aspired to become the master of the whole of the rest of China. In 1265 Kublai ordered his vassal, the Korean King of Koma, to transport Kublai's

envoys to Japan, where they were, in effect, to demand the submission of the Japanese. No answer having been received from the Japanese, Kublai made preparations for the invasion and conquest of Japan. The invasion, begun in November 1274, was conducted upon a large scale and may be likened to the attempted conquest of the Greeks by the Persians under Darius. The Japanese put up the same desperate resistance against forces superior in numbers and in equipment as had the ancient Greeks at Marathon, and with equal success. Like the Persians at Marathon, the Mongols and Koreans were forced to take to their ships and to beat an ignominious retreat, thus ending Kublai's first invasion of the Mikado's realms.

Undiscouraged by his first failure, Kublai now made preparations upon a much larger scale, and in 1281, collecting a large fleet of ocean-going ships, embarked no fewer than 100,000 Mongols and Chinese upon them at a port on the Chinese mainland opposite Formosa. The fleet bearing this host was directed to effect a junction in the Korean straits with another fleet of 1,000 vessels, carrying 50,000 Mongol and 20,000 Korean soldiers.

The details of the struggle, as momentous in world history as that of the Greeks with the army and navy of Xerxes, are unfortunately missing. For fifty-three days, on land and sea, the fighting

went on almost without intermission. Like the ancient Greeks, the Japanese displayed the most desperate valour, and although pitted against a foe so superior in fighting strength and equipment, did not confine themselves to the defensive. Grappling with, they boarded the enemy's ships, and their two-handed swords wrought terrible execution among the invaders. Like England in 1588, in the struggle with the Spanish Armada, Japan was saved by the elements. A tempest arose, shattering the Mongol fleet. What remained of Kublai's army re-embarked and the second and last invasion of Japan was over.

For centuries Japan was now enabled to pursue her way unmolested by other Powers, with one or two minor interruptions to her security. In 1419 friendly relations with China ended when a Mongolian-Korean fleet attacked Tsushima and was beaten off by the Japanese. In 1529 there was a fresh quarrel, and in 1531 a Chinese squadron again appeared off Tsushima and was again defeated and put to flight. The rest of the sixteenth century was taken up for the most part in internal strifes, having for their object the unification of Japan and the crushing of the feudal barons and militant Buddhist monks of central and eastern Honshiu. In 1592 Japan's great military leader, Hideyoshi, having put the finishing touches on the consolidation of the Island Empire, now turned his thoughts to the mainland and

undertook the conquest of Korea and China. Had he not died in 1598, it is probable that his endeavours would have met with more or less success in view of the initial advantages he had already won in his campaigns against the Chino-Korean armies. His death, however, brought the war to an end: an armistice was concluded in Korea and the Mikado's forces were soon afterwards withdrawn. Within a few decades thereafter took place the decisive step (1636), inaugurated by the Shogun Iyemitsu, closing Japan entirely to foreigners with the exception of an occasional Dutch trading ship that was permitted to enter the port of Nagasaki. After 1790 only one Dutch ship a year was permitted so to trade, and it is not until the Restoration, definitely accomplished in 1868, that Japan once again formally resumed relations with foreign Powers.

In the subsequent years, as Japan, adopting Western methods, arose to Imperial greatness, her foreign policy became fixed along lines that were imposed upon her by her history and by her geographical location. Like England after the Norman Conquest, Japan had recognized the advantages of her insularity in successfully resisting foreign invasion. Like England, Japan now recognized that her future security must, in the first instance, rest upon a fleet basis. And again like England, Japan perceived the menace to her existence that might result by reason of the

establishment of a strong Power opposite to her upon the mainland, and adopted similar measures to overcome it.

Korea and the Russian Maritime Province form the western boundary of the Sea of Japan. They are separated from the Japanese archipelago by a distance across the Sea of Japan, at its narrowest point, no greater than that which separates Antwerp or Rotterdam from the City of London. This stretch of coastland occupies a position of the same strategical importance with reference to Japan that the mouths of the Scheldt and the Rhine do to England. Korea was a vassal State of China, but it was evident to Japan that unless she did something about the matter herself, Korea would inevitably fall an easy prey to Russia, in which event she would have at her very doors, and within easy striking distance of her coasts, one of the most powerful and militaristic nations in the world. In February 1890 the Tsar Alexander III had issued a rescript authorizing the construction of a railway across Siberia. It was to be completed in ten years. Commenced at both ends, the eastern section had been opened in September 1893. Unless Japan speedily became the suzerain of Korea, she might see the peninsula snatched from her grasp by Russia. Japan accordingly first made war on China (in 1894–5) to rid Korea of Chinese influence and to substitute her own, and ten years

later (in 1904–5) on Russia, to prevent Russia from extending her influence and sovereignty over Korea. Japan succeeded in both of these wars, and in 1910 annexed Korea out and out. There remains yet the Maritime Province, with the great fortified port of Vladivostok. In Russia's present internal and external difficulties Japan sees an opportunity for the fulfilment of the rest of her aspirations in this region, namely, the conquest of the Maritime Province and the extension of Japanese influence over the entire country in Siberia east of Lake Baikal.

Thus far the leading lines of British and of Japanese foreign policy are identical, and have been shaped, as I have pointed out, by the same general principles—sea-power as the basis of insular security and a continental policy that involves the subjection, by war or diplomacy, sometimes by means of both together, of a too ambitious rival.

Relying upon the continued application of this policy by England after the close of the war, Japanese diplomats reckon as a factor in her future foreign policy that the European Continent may be split into various groups and factions in which, on the one hand, a French group, inflamed thereto by England, will persist in a policy of revenge and exhaust themselves in the effort to reduce Germany to utter impotence. And, on the other hand, the various other con-

tending groups will split up or weaken themselves in the conflict beyond the point of recovery.

To fish in such troubled waters as these would be easy work for the Mikado's statesmen, for Japan has her own ends to gain in the Far East. With a European Continent exhausted and broken up into various warring camps and the United States withdrawing herself in splendid isolation, Japan would be courted as never before. No Power or combination of Powers would want to offend her. Moreover, the possibility, always present to the understanding of European diplomats, of an alliance of Japan with a rehabilitated Russia and a resuscitated Germany, makes this final factor of Japan's foreign policy of almost transcendental importance to her future expansion as a nation.

Indeed, so great are the possibilities of new combinations among the European and Asiatic States which the recent war and the Peace Treaties have called into being, that it may not be without value to discuss in my next chapter some of the new alignments of the Powers that are reasonably to be expected in the coming days, if we leave out of consideration the possibility of America, England, Germany and Russia joining with one another to preserve the future peace of the world.

CHAPTER FIVE

SOME POSSIBLE FUTURE COMBINATIONS

THE principal result of the World War thus far has been to secure for England the practically undisputed hegemony of the world. The United States might have had it had President Wilson been able to stick to his original programme and the Fourteen Points. But British diplomacy and statesmanship, made wise by the handling of just such problems for centuries past, understood how to organize effective opposition to President Wilson's proposals, and when the Peace Conference met the American leader had not long to wait before he discovered that his plans were being undermined from every direction. It was not a difficult task for Britain's trained diplomats to play upon French credulity and French fears and to hold Italy in leading strings because of the latter's financial and economic dependence upon England and her hopes for securing British support to her aspirations in the settlement of her Peace problems. Accordingly, in the face of the combined attack of England, France, Italy and

Japan, President Wilson felt himself compelled to sacrifice one after the other of his Fourteen Points in order to rescue, as he believed, a last remnant of his great programme, namely, the League of Nations, by whose help he still hoped to eventually carry out his plans. But even here President Wilson met with failure. The mandate idea was taken over by England and cleverly adapted to suit her own projects, and the Monroe Doctrine was likewise treated to a dose of British medicine, with the result that it emerged from the ordeal in a much weakened state of health and emasculated of much of its vigour. Moreover, the bankruptcy of President Wilson's policy in Paris had brought down upon him the opposition of the American Senate at home, which, when the treaty was presented to it, refused to honour President Wilson's signature thereto, placing its opposition on the high patriotic ground that the treaty was a danger to America and a menace to American interests throughout the world. And accordingly, with the rejection of the treaty by the American Senate, American foreign policy has once more withdrawn itself into its former channels, leaving European and general world politics alone and confining itself to its narrower commercial and political interests in the Central and South American States and in the Far East.

With America, the one Great Power that might have checkmated her, eliminated from the race

for world dominion, England pursued a course that led straight to her goal. French aspirations involving the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine were opposed because this would have made France politically the dominant factor on the Continent, and would, sooner or later, have forced Germany to place herself under French leadership, if she wished to survive, with the result that eventually a continental block might arise, with France at its head, to dispute with England the question of world hegemony. To prevent this, England will see to it that Germany is not too greatly weakened in comparison with France and that the feeling of antagonism between the two nations is kept alive.

In the case of Italy, British politics required that Italy should have to dance to the British fiddle. An economically and financially independent Italy meant, for such a vital race as the Italian, that in a few short decades Italy would have attained to the hegemony over the Mediterranean, including much of the African littoral. Already in North Africa, as in Tunis, there are signs that the Italians, by reason of their superior racial vitality and a deeper seated colonizing instinct, are crowding out the French.

Italy had hoped that a successful ending of the war would place her in a position to revive the glories of the Venetian Republic of former days, and that undisputed possession of the Adriatic

and its principal ports on the Dalmatian shore would render her position in the Mediterranean impregnable and give to her a practical mastery of the Levant. But the Peace Conference, led by England, willed it otherwise, and Italy will lose the Dalmatian coast, with the islands, except Lavinia and Lissa, and she will have opposed to her in possession of that coast the hostile Serbo-Slav State, which, by retaining places of such high strategical importance as Sebenico and the strongly fortified Cattaro, is in a position to completely nullify the value of the Adriatic to Italy as a factor in her imperialistic plans of expansion.

It is not alone that Italy has been deprived of these points of advantage that makes the Italian cup of disappointment run over, but it is the fact that there has been created by the Supreme Council, at the behest of England, a powerful Greek State, a sort of Eastern financial agent for England, with the great ports of Piræus, Salonika and Smyrna, through which important currents of trade between Asia, Africa and Europe will flow, rather than through the Italian ports in the Adriatic. British support of Greece in the expansion of the latter's territory at the expense of Bulgaria and Turkey makes it clear that Greece may continue to rely on British support in the future, all the more in view of the fact that it is the racially allied Bulgars, Magyars and Turks who are the most severely treated in the dispensation

of the Peace terms which England has permitted the Supreme Council to hand out. It is true that Italy has received as a sop an economic mandate over a part of the Anatolian coast, but she has had to resign herself to the loss of Smyrna and the Dodekanese Islands, and in the concession to her of the coal mines of Heraklea, the French are permitted to retain a 25 per cent. interest.

The Serbo-Slav State, Italy's most formidable future rival, has no outlet upon the Ægæan Sea. Its future, commercially, rests apparently upon the Adriatic. With the necessary ports secured to Serbia upon the Adriatic, a thing she agitated for constantly before the war, the Serbo-Slav State will in the future constitutute a natural ally for Greece, and to this alliance will, naturally, also come Rumania, for it will be the task of these three States to hold in check Hungary and Bulgaria, at whose expense this triple alliance has so greatly profited by way of annexation of territory.

Italy, on the other hand, looks to Germany and to Russia. Absolutely dependent on England for her means of subsistence—coal—and shut off, if need be, from Russia's Black Sea ports, whence Italy could draw food, raw materials and coal, by reason of Britain's control of the Dardanelles, Italy sees herself entirely isolated overseas in any future conflict in which she has not England behind her. Accordingly, it is only common sense

and logic for Italy to want to restore land communications with the great natural sources of supply for her imports and the two great markets for her exports—Russia and Germany.

One has only to think of the fact that the greatest Sea Power in the world has the absolute control of every highway that permits of passage in or out of the Mediterranean in order to understand how literally true it is that Britain holds in her grasp the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa. Gibraltar, Suez, the Dardanelles—these are the pillars upon which Britain has built up her present world hegemony. With each one of these continents split up into innumerable cross-currents of interests, England can now impose her will upon them all, and it is not going too far to say that henceforth, and so long as this hegemony continues, no nation in the world may attempt anything that strokes against the will or the interests of England.

It is nevertheless true that there are elements of weakness in Britain's present position which are giving her statesmen a great deal of food for anxious thought. For example, a hostile alliance between Germany, Russia and Japan, between Germany, Russia and China, or even between Germany and Russia alone must be avoided even at the price of making some important concessions.

A certain clever German said at the beginning of the war, when he heard of England's entrance

on the side of Germany's enemies, "O weh, mein Vaterland! England macht nie eine falsche Rechnung" ("Alas, my Fatherland! England never makes a mistake in her calculations"). There are many who believe that England has now, for the first time in her history, made such a mistake in occupying the Dardanelles and Constantinople. They point out that for centuries Russia has fought for these prizes and that in the recent war they would have been assured to her had she not been obliged to fall away from her allies owing to her military defeats and the consequences of her Revolution. But in opposing Russia at the Straits and in Constantinople, England is not pursuing a new line of policy. It is merely Disraeli's statesmanship all over again. Said Lord Cromer, "Had it not been for the Crimean War, and the policy subsequently adopted by Lord Beaconsfield's Government, the independence of the Balkan States would never have been achieved, and the Russians would now be in possession of Constantinople."

Prior to the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, there were three great outlets for the trade of Asia into Europe. They were Constantinople, Alexandria and the Syrian coast. Turkey was a non-commercial Power, and from the moment of her ascendancy, between the years 1453 and 1516, Turkey blocked one after the other of the great trade routes between East and West

which had hitherto been maintained chiefly in the interests of the Western nations of Europe. Accordingly, the Ottoman conquest of the Near East was one of the decisive events in world history. After that conquest the Western world found itself compelled to choose between forgoing its profits in trade with the East, or, unless it made war on the Turk to recover possession of the trade-routes and trading centres, to discover a new route to the East with the continuity of which the Ottomans could not interfere. Europe preferred the latter alternative, and hence the great maritime activity displayed at Cadiz, at Bristol and at Lisbon during the latter half of the fifteenth century. Eventually England, by her mastery of these new sea-routes to the East, became the world's greatest trader and grasped the lion's share in the overseas trade with the Orient. Thus the situation remained down to the beginning of the present century.

At about that time Russia began extending her railroads into the region of the Middle East and a commencement was made in the construction of the Bagdad Railway, which was to have brought direct overland connection between the Persian Gulf and the German ports in the North Sea. Such projects as these threatened, therefore, a loss to England, by diversion to the overland routes of a great part of her carrying trade with the East. Then came the World War, and its more than suc-

cessful conclusion for England placed her in the favourable position of controlling, for the first time since the Turkish conquest, not only the principal sea-routes to the East, but the principal land-routes as well.

The occupancy of Egypt, with the great ports of Alexandria, Port Said and the Canal, the control now exercised over Constantinople and the Straits, and the possession of the mandate in Palestine, carrying with it, as it does, full sway over the transportation lines in Syria, place England in a most enviable position with respect to the trade of the Near and Middle East, for she is now enabled to levy tribute on pretty nearly all of it.

Looking back at the question of Syria, one sees how completely isolated economically that country will be in French hands, unless the French call upon and make use of British co-operation. Just as, in ancient times, goods from the East found their way to the head of the Persian Gulf, thence by way of Basra, Bagdad and Damascus to the Syrian seaboard, so in the future trade will to a large extent follow the same route, and England holds in her grasp both the first and the last stages of this trunk line. The French in Syria, sandwiched in between two British spheres of influence, must yield the palm to the latter.

The future position of France is in some doubt. France may remain an ally of England, but, if

so, it becomes a rather one-sided arrangement, for the reason that England will take no chances of losing her newly won position through taking sides in any French quarrel in which her own vital interests are not affected. For France, the friendship of such States as Poland and Czecho-Slavia is but a poor substitute for the loss of her great Russian ally. The fate of all of these newly created States is still absolutely uncertain. For a chauvinistic people like the Poles, the trials of peace will be more difficult to overcome than the trials of war. Accordingly, with respect to the new States, it is impossible to forecast anything with reasonable certainty, except that things, in the end, will probably turn out quite differently from what most of us at present expect.

CHAPTER SIX

JAPAN'S MODERN WORLD DIPLOMACY

THE American Government must never forget one thing, namely, that if a condition can be brought about whereby it were to lose the aid and moral support of Europe, and, at the same time, if Japan were to succeed in freeing herself from outside interference or menace—in other words, if Japan can succeed in isolating the United States politically—she will then be in a position to throw down the gauntlet to America and to let a decision at arms determine the question of the hegemony of the Far East and the Pacific.

Japan has already partly consolidated her position in the Far East by establishing her military superiority over China and Russia, and the object of the twenty-one demands imposed on the former in 1915 and of the secret treaty exacted from the latter in 1916, was to further the plans of the Japanese Imperialists directed primarily against the United States.

America's profound interest in the fate of China, consistently recognized by all American

statesmen of the past and moulded into a principle under the name of the Hay Doctrine, had first to be undermined in order that Japan's paramountcy in China might stand forth as an established fact. Without strife, if possible; with strife, if need be. For, otherwise, how could Japan, an industrially backward State as compared with some of the great Western nations, hope to compete and to make headway in the markets of China, as against the products of her industrially and commercially superior Western rivals, except by having preferential facilities in those markets? For, without such facilities, she perceived her own home industries doomed to suffer such a handicap as would rob them of any prospect of future expansion and legitimate healthful growth.

Moreover, Japan's new arrangement with Russia, above referred to, had likewise for its object to secure the submission of the only other Great Power, save the United States, who might be expected ever to challenge the Japanese claim to the hegemony of the Far East. With China and Russia disposed of, the Mikado's diplomats figured that they had in the future to wait for the right opportunity only, when, for one reason or another, the United States would stand alone in world politics and be left without friends or allies to aid her in the supreme contest that will then be unloosed for the prizes that lie about the

shores of the Pacific waiting for a world conqueror to pick them up.

At the very least the Russo-Japanese *rapprochement* was to assure Japan against an attack upon her right flank in Manchuria, in case of a war with America. And now that Russia, since 1917, has been eliminated, for the time being, from the international diplomatic chess-board, and her promises of 1916 are no longer of value, Japan seeks to attain the same ends by seizing Russia's Maritime Province and by establishing her influence in Siberia as far west as Lake Baikal, under the pretence of setting up a buffer State in that region to protect Japan from Bolshevist influences. The ruse is, of course, only too palpable a one, and will hardly succeed in deceiving the most credulous. The real purpose is just what it was in 1916, when Russia was still a Great Power to be reckoned with. An understanding with Russia, which at that time could be reached by means of the pen, must now, by reason of intervening circumstances, be attained by means of the sword, and the Nipponese will no doubt succeed in proving, in this case, that the hand that employed the one instrument can, with equal facility, wield the other.

To jockey her allies into such a position that they would all have to assent to her having a free hand in China was the primary object of Japan's diplomacy, for which she laboured unceasingly

throughout the war, and had the United States Senate ratified the Treaty of Versailles, thereby placing the seal of American sanction upon the spoliation of China in Shantung, Japan's object would have been attained in its entirety.

Russia's precarious position during the war, after the success of the great German offensive in 1915, had forced her to agree to all of Japan's demands. Likewise, Japan's other allies, England, France and Italy, were obliged to sign away their freedom of action in the determination of matters affecting Japan's paramount position in the Far East, by reason of the fact that there was an ever-present possibility throughout the war that they might need Japan's further help to defeat Germany, and the fear existed, moreover, that to offend Japan's susceptibilities might even mean the transfer of her support from the side of the Allies to the side of Germany.

Having successfully navigated her ship of state through the troublous seas of war and diplomacy to the point we have indicated, Japan now perceived but one remaining obstacle in her pathway, and all her efforts thenceforth were to be directed towards the removal of this last hindrance to the attainment of her supreme desire.

Accordingly, upon the entrance of the United States into the war the Japanese, partly by veiled threats and partly by painting the internal situation in China as necessitating the strong inter-

vening hand of Japan, undertook to gain the adherence of the United States to her policies in China. And, indeed, they laboured with some success. America, on the eve of putting all her strength into the European contest, felt impelled to jettison some of her cargo in the Far East, but she did so very reluctantly and left open for herself as many avenues of retreat from the new course she was entering upon as it was possible to do.

Baron Ishii, chief of the Japanese Mission, who conducted the negotiations with Secretary Lansing, did not perhaps secure all he meant to do, when he left Washington with an agreement in his pocket which gave the formal recognition of the United States to Japan's "special interests" in China. But what Japan herein lacked in the form of explicit declaration she more than made up by the methods with which the new agreement was exploited in the Far East.

China, that had been, one might easily say, from time immemorial so staunch a friend of America, felt herself abandoned and betrayed. She deeply resented this action of the United States, so gravely affecting her sovereign rights and so wounding to her pride and dignity as an independent nation. Two nations, one of them her age-long friend, had got together in secret and had arranged to dispose of her rights without so much as "by your leave."

Indeed, had the internal troubles of China at this time been less poignant, there conceivably might have arisen a situation whereby the action of the United States would have driven China completely into the arms of Germany, whose ultimate success in the war many leading Chinese regarded as practically the only safeguard against the aggressive aims of Japan, which were then taking on an ever-increasing attitude of menace that was threatening China with the complete destruction of her sovereignty and the entire loss of her independence.

The United States, particularly through the influence of her very able and energetic Minister at Peking, Mr. Paul S. Reinsch, was able in great part to counteract the effect of this baleful Japanese propaganda, exploiting to the utmost a Japanese interpretation of the far-reaching effect of the Ishii-Lansing Agreement, with the result that China was eventually induced to enter the war on the side of the Allies.

When the Peace Conference met, Japan was well aware that she would have to reckon with no opposition to her plans on the part of England, France and Italy. But she had still to reckon with the probable opposition of the United States, and the problem was how to win over the latter country to the full recognition of her paramount position in China, already, as it was believed, quite firmly secured to her by reason of the con-

sent, embodied in the secret treaties, which had been wrung from Russia, England, France and Italy in 1917.

In spite of the fact that she held these trump cards, Japan recognized that America was a factor that could not be left out of the calculation, if the question was to be considered settled for all time.

Accordingly, Japan set to work, and soon perceived that she might hope to attain her ends if the seeds of dissension could be sown among the members of the Conference, whereby, in the midst of contending factions, the weight of her own great influence could always be thrown in favour of those who stood to support her claims.

The decision of the members of the Conference, at its opening session, to hold their meetings behind closed doors was perhaps the greatest triumph that could have been wished for by those members of the Peace Conference who, like Japan, had secret agreements in their portfolios, and who hoped to secure great advantages for themselves by reason of a lack of unity among the conferees, which secret diplomacy would engender and which the centrifugal forces thus set in motion would perpetuate.

From the moment that the first point in Wilson's programme—open diplomacy—was abandoned by its author, Japan's representatives knew that her aims were attainable and that the last hindrance to recognition of her supremacy in the

Far East must dissolve, like the proverbial noonday mist before the sun, under the influence of the poisonous gases of revenge, jealousy and ambition which the close atmosphere of the secret Conference Chamber would generate.

The bearing of the Japanese conferees throughout the various sessions of the Conference was a master-work of Eastern *finesse*. For, beneath the attitude of calm and indifference which Baron Makino and his colleagues invariably displayed, there burned the fires of intense excitement as they followed the various acts in the development of the great world drama that were to mean so much to the future weal or woe of their Fatherland.

When the Conference opened, the representatives of the Land of the Rising Sun saw a Japanese sky black with the threatening clouds that had come up out of the West. The Japanese statesmen had come to Paris in no confident mood. But once the Conference had committed itself to the holding of secret sessions and the first breach in the Wilson programme had been made, like magic the menacing portents that had been gathering in the heavens that surround the Island Empire disappeared, perhaps never to return. At any rate, such was the aspect of affairs as they appeared to the Japanese representatives at the beginning of the Conference, and subsequent events, down to the close of the Conference and

the return of President Wilson to America, only confirmed them in their first impressions.

They had held back, and had waited for the right moment to play their trump cards. The rubber was won at Paris, but the game was lost at Washington, when the Senate of the United States refused to endorse the promissory notes issued at Versailles.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE QUESTIONS OF RACE EQUALITY AND SHANTUNG

On February 13, 1919, the text of the first draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations was laid before the members of the Peace Conference for discussion and for the consideration of any proposed amendments thereto.

With the approval, it is said, of Mr. Lloyd George and of President Wilson, Baron Makino, head of the Japanese delegation, had introduced an amendment to this draft whereunder the League of Nations covenanted to put a stop to the discriminatory treatment which in certain parts of the world was still being unjustly meted out to nations and to the individual nationals of certain nations, on the sole basis of a difference in race. Thus, in spite of the fact that the United States, like all the other Great Powers, has entered into treaty relations with Japan in which the Japanese are granted the privileges of the most favoured nation, the United States permits discrimination to be shown in certain States of the West against the acquirement of citizenship on the part of

Japanese nationals and against their ownership of real property in those States. Similar conditions exist in Australasia and in British Columbia.

Against the aforementioned amendment, introduced by Baron Makino, Mr. Charles Hughes, the Premier of Australia, raised a loud and vigorous protesting voice. Among other powerful arguments with which he attempted to justify his opposition, he insinuated that the Japanese, of all peoples, were the last who had the right to complain of discriminatory treatment, in view of the manner in which they interpreted the doctrine of the equality of races in their attitude towards the Koreans and the Chinese. The Koreans had been treated as an inferior, subject people and their nation had been robbed of its independence. The Chinese were about to suffer the same fate as the Koreans, unless the Western nations intervened. Accordingly, argued Mr. Hughes, the Japanese proposal was purely an exercise in hypocrisy, and represented an attempt on their part to promote, by indirect methods, their real object, which was to secure the hegemony in Asia and the Pacific. If the British Dominions and the United States were to permit unrestricted immigration to those countries in compliance with the Japanese demand, they would simply be playing the Japanese game and promote Japan's hidden designs.

In consequence of the feelings aroused in both

the British and the American delegations by reason of Mr. Hughes's vigorous onslaught, the Mikado's representatives decided not to push the amendment any further at that time and to let the whole proposition rest until the return from America of President Wilson, in March, at which time the discussion of the Covenant and of any amendments thereto would be renewed.

During President Wilson's absence in America a powerful opposition to this race amendment clause began to manifest itself, not only in Australia, but likewise in New Zealand and in Canada. And in the United States the fear was fostered that consideration of the race amendment clause would result in dragging the vexatious immigration question into the debate.

Lord Robert Cecil declared that, however much sympathy one might have with the idea, it was impossible to include the principle of the equality of races in the Covenant of the League of Nations without interfering in the internal affairs of the States affected thereby. Accordingly, Japan was informed that England must decline to support the amendment.

The Anglo-Saxon countries being united in their opposition to the amendment, the Japanese delegation now directed their efforts towards an alteration in its form, so as to make the same a part of the preamble of the Covenant, without inclusion in the terms of the body of the instru-

ment. Moreover, a change was made in the phraseology of the text of the amendment in its new form. Careful avoidance was made of employing the word "race" in the draft now presented, and the principle of race equality was cleverly preserved by the use of the following terms: "by the maintenance of the principle of the equality of nations and of the just treatment of their nationals."

At the meeting of the League of Nations Committee of the Peace Conference held on April 11, 1919, the amendment in the altered form above set forth was introduced by Baron Makino. In the course of a well-argued speech supporting the amendment, he called particular attention to the fact that it was the desire of the people and of the Government of Japan, most positively expressed in word and deed, that the principle he was now contending for be given due recognition in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Both Baron Makino and his able colleague, Viscount Chinda, addressed the Committee, and their eloquent efforts to set forth the justice of their claim in the fairest possible light made a profound impression upon their audience. It may be easily imagined that the impression produced upon M. Clemenceau, who was representing France upon the Committee, was a particularly deep one, in view of the fact that in France and her colonial possessions the immigration problem, as we know

it, does not exist and there is no race question for them at all.

The amendment came to a vote. Eleven States supported it, six States rejected it. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the amendment had been carried by so large a majority, President Wilson, as Chairman of the Committee, declared the defeat of the amendment on the ground that acceptance required a unanimous approval. In other words, the negative vote of a single member of the Committee could defeat the amendment. This decision, although a purely arbitrary one of President Wilson, as was shown afterwards by the adoption of other amendments without a unanimity of voices, was acquiesced in by Japan when it was seen that none of the States represented on the Committee ventured to enter a protest.

The Japanese had met with a check, but even so their cause was not dead yet, and the situation for them was anything but a desperate one at this stage of the negotiations. In the regular course of events and in accordance with the rules of the Conference, the League of Nations Committee would have to report to the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference, as a committee of the whole, and only by them could it be definitively determined what the exact terms of the new draft of the Covenant were to be. The Japanese were in a position to plead, not alone the justice of

their claims but also the further very important fact that an overwhelming majority of the Committee to whom the claim had been referred had voted in favour of its adoption, and even their opponents had been constrained to vote as they did not from conviction, but impelled thereto by expediency—the exigencies of home politics required it.

In any case, the Japanese diplomats had secured a strategical advantage of the first importance, whereby, if they saw fit to pursue the matter to its utmost limits, they would have behind them the moral forces of the world, and it was thereby made possible for them to wreck the organization of the League of Nations if such an amendment as they were presenting, resting as it did upon incontrovertible moral grounds, should be rejected.

In other words, the attitude of certain of the Great Powers towards the Japanese race amendment to the Covenant of the League of Nations provided the Mikado's statesmen with a good trading proposition, so that when the measures of really vital import to the Island Empire came up for consideration before the Conference, Baron Makino and his colleagues could press for their acceptance with less likelihood of meeting a rebuff. For when, soon thereafter, the question of Shantung came up for consideration, the Japanese were in a position to say to the Conference that if it was immoral and unjust for Japan to demand

Shantung, it was equally immoral and unjust for the Conference to require that Japan give up her claim to the recognition of race equality.

On April 19th and the days following, an opportunity was given both to the Japanese and to the Chinese delegates to place their case before the Council of Four. The Chinese delegation demanded the unconditional return of the Shantung territory, occupied by Japan, to China. Baron Makino, however, was only willing to promise restoration on certain conditions, such as were embodied in various secret agreements which China had been compelled to sign in 1915 and in 1918. The Chinese objection to this proposition was, of course, that having signed the aforesaid agreements under coercion they never had any validity and were null and void.

President Wilson supported the Chinese contention and pronounced very strongly in favour of a complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Japanese from Shantung. The Japanese delegation combated the Chinese contention and insisted that the agreements in question were entirely outside the jurisdiction of the Peace Conference and were, therefore, not a subject that it was permissible to discuss. The Council of Four thereupon suggested to both sides that the solution of the question be postponed until a preliminary Peace had been signed and that the question should then be laid before the League of

Nations for decision. To this proposal the Chinese delegation gave their immediate consent. Not so the Japanese. Baron Makino demanded that a decision be reached before the arrival of the German plenipotentiaries at Versailles.

In the meantime the Peace Conference assembled in Plenary Session on April 28th for the purpose of adopting the definitive terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was anticipated that at this session the Japanese delegation would once again bring forward the race amendment and that the occasion might give rise to some lively exchanges between the Japanese proponents, on the one side, and the Anglo-Saxon opponents, on the other.

There was an atmosphere of tense excitement in the assembly when Baron Makino took the floor and began to speak. His speech was a short but masterful exposition of the Japanese point of view, but it soon became apparent that the head of the Japanese delegation was speaking in no challenging mood, but, on the contrary, was prepared to make concessions. He set forth that the principle of the equality of nations was embodied in the very nature and structure of the League of Nations. There could never, he argued, be constituted a real Society of Nations unless the members composing it should mutually guarantee to apply the principle of equal and just treatment towards all the members, without dis-

crimination as to race or nationality. It was not his purpose, he said, to urge the acceptance of the Japanese proposal at the present stage, but he considered it his duty to give public utterance to the feeling of bitter disappointment that animated the Japanese people and Government by reason of the rejection of the amendment by the League of Nations Committee, to whom the matter had been presented. And although, he added in conclusion, the Imperial Government was prepared to express its acquiescence in the ruling at the present time, it reserved the right to present the matter again at the proper time to the Council of the League of Nations.

Makino's clever speech did not fail of its intended effect. The moderation and unselfishness of the Japanese were thus plainly demonstrated. It would have been invidious to even suggest that the Imperial Government, in reality, cared less than two straws for the adoption of the principle of race equality at the present juncture.

That would have been to rob them of one of the sharpest weapons in their diplomatic armoury.

Up to now the Japanese had only been fencing. At this point began the real battle for the settlement of the Shantung question. The matter had to be fought out in the Council of Four, reduced to Three now, by reason of Orlando's withdrawal in the Fiume controversy. Only President Wilson opposed the Japanese demands. Clemenceau and

Lloyd George, embarrassed by their consciousness of the secret treaties, suggested postponement and delay. Against President Wilson's obstinacy the Japanese perceived only one means of success. It was to be a desperate venture, but the Japanese evidently knew their man. The Supreme Council was presented with an ultimatum. President Wilson must withdraw his opposition or the Japanese delegation would depart for home. In the latter alternative it was intimated that a separate Peace would be made with Germany and an economic and financial consortium closed with her to exploit Russia.

This bombshell was exploded at the very moment that the German delegation reached Versailles for the purpose of hearing and receiving the Peace terms. Clemenceau and Lloyd George, thoroughly alarmed at the prospect with which they were confronted, now in turn threatened the President with the loss of his League of Nations, a project to which the President had wholly given himself and for the sake of which, as they knew, he could be compelled to make sacrifices. Face to face with such a bitter alternative, the President succumbed, and China was offered up a victim on the altar of Western selfishness.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SHANTUNG QUESTION

It is a fortunate thing for America that President Wilson's capitulation to Japanese Imperialism and his abandonment of his principles in the face of the adroit manœuvres of his astute colleagues at Paris were set at naught by the subsequent action of the United States Senate. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how President Wilson could ever have believed that the American people would accept the odium of such an iniquitous transaction.

The Shantung decision of the Peace Conference involved not alone one iniquity towards China—it was, in fact, a combination of iniquities. It concerned the recognition and approval of a whole series of infamous acts committed by Japan in her relations with China since the outbreak of the war. When Japan, in May 1915, forced China to accept the twenty-one demands, the question of the future disposition of Shantung was an integral part thereof. By the twenty-one demands China was compelled to grant Japan the rights which she sought in the province of Shantung. China had yielded to *force majeure* and

under protest. Foreign sympathy for China in the face of this high-handed act of aggression was exhibited everywhere, and it was generally believed that when the Great Powers, Japan's allies, were released from the tension of the war, they would join with America in some action that would restore China in her rights.

The twenty-one demands involved much more than the Shantung concession to Japan. They included also very far-reaching financial, economic and political concessions to Japan, amounting, in fact, to a virtual protectorate.

Accordingly, when the Peace Conference not only failed to put on record its unqualified disapproval of the twenty-one demands, but actually placed the stamp of its approval on one of the most important of them, the Chinese nation had great reason to feel that they were being delivered over, tied hand and foot, to the tender mercies of their arch-enemy. Moreover, the betrayal was made more flagrant by reason of the fact that it was consummated in the face of the practically unanimous opposition of public opinion throughout the world. This was the first iniquity.

The second iniquity was that the Shantung concession was embodied in the Peace Treaty, into which had been incorporated the Covenant of the League of Nations, under which the signatory Powers, "in order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and

security . . . by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations."

That there are many unjust and immoral conditions contained in the treaty is now pretty generally admitted. Such conditions, in so far as they were imposed upon the enemy States, are at least understandable in view of the state of the public mind in the victorious countries at the end of the war. What is not understandable, however, is that a friend and an ally, and one that had made important sacrifices for the cause of the Allies, should be treated, at the end of the war, as an enemy and even worse than an enemy. For the action of the Peace Conference involved not alone the loss to China of one of her richest and most important provinces, but it affected the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese nation in a manner that vitally touches sovereignty. Indeed, fairly regarded, the Shantung decision of the Peace Conference was merely the first step in the ultimate partition of China and the destruction of Chinese independence.

To embody such an act of spoliation, involving

a breach of every one of the noble professions which we have quoted from the preamble of the Covenant of the League of Nations, in the very instrument in which those professions are declared to be the guide for the future conduct of the world, could not have failed to spell disaster, not alone for the treaty, but for the League of Nations—the one hope of mankind for a better world order.

The third iniquity we have to consider very closely touches the honour of the United States. It was at the instance of the United States that the Peking Government, in March 1917, after very carefully considering the bearing and consequences of their act, broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. If not explicitly expressed, although the contrary is maintained by some well-informed persons, it was at least tacitly understood that China's participation in the war on the side of the Allies would necessarily carry with it certain advantages for China at the ensuing Peace Conference, not the least among which was to be the release of China from the pressure and aggression of Japan. Indeed, China's negotiators made it quite plain to the Powers that she had no impelling reasons for joining in a war against Germany, a nation towards whom the Chinese had the kindliest feelings, except the one fact that thereby China hoped to provide herself with the means and the opportunity to resist the encroach-

ments of Japan. And how did the European nations meet this frankness of China's statesmen? They met it by entering into a secret treaty with Japan in February–March 1917 (at the very time that the Peking Government broke off diplomatic relations with Germany), conceding to Japan, among other things, her claims upon Shantung. And as a further evidence of good faith they kept the fact a secret from China and the United States until February 1919, when the matter was being thrashed out at the Peace Conference. The European Allies, knowing that they would have to abandon and betray China at the Peace Conference, permitted the United States to pledge her honour to China, and then had the face to attempt a justification by appealing to the sacredness of the secret treaties. In other words, the Allies gave Japan an invalid promissory note in 1917, and, having disclosed the fact two years later, succeeded in securing its payment by procuring the responsible endorsement of Uncle Sam thereon. Nothing in international relations has ever been more infamous.

We have mentioned three iniquities that characterize the action of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference with reference to Shantung. Out of these iniquities flowed consequences of a very far-reaching character and of which the end cannot as yet be seen.

Firstly, the situation aroused intense feeling

throughout China, and the national sentiment was expressed by the action of the Chinese Peace delegates, who refused to sign the Peace Treaty. No amount of persuasion on the part of their former Allies could move them, and in answer to the cynical assurance offered them by the Supreme Council that China could safely rely on the League of Nations to set everything at rights sometime in the future, the Chinese delegates merely answered that there was little to be hoped for from a League of Nations when the very instrument which created it authorized or permitted the violation and nullification of every vital principle for which the League of Nations was supposed to stand.

In their abstention from the treaty and their refusal to accept any compromises on the question of Shantung, the Chinese delegation saw their best remedy against the paralyzing effect of the Supreme Council's decision. If that decision were carried into effect, it meant a great deal more to China than the mere loss of a province. It meant that international sanction had been given to the acts of a nation that was seeking to rob her of her independence. It meant the revival of the twenty-one demands in their full force.

In the stand they took, the Chinese delegation had behind them the practically unanimous sentiment of their countrymen, who had come to the silent resolve that, cost what it might, they would

repudiate the agreement forced upon them in 1915. The Chinese people, whose capacity for passive resistance is incalculable, are determined to make a stand as regards this question, and it will be strange indeed if they do not succeed in carrying their point, even against the combined machinations of their enemies.

We have, secondly, to consider that the manner in which the Supreme Council played with the principles of the League of Nations in the very instrument that created it brought it to pass that the League was born in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Those principles had been discussed throughout the world, and they had come to be held in sacred regard by the majority of peoples and by the intellectuals of all lands. But these very circles were the first to detect the hollowness of the professions which belied themselves in the very instrument that gave them birth. The new-born child was received nowhere with open arms. Its would-be foster parents treated it like a stepchild. The action of China's delegation had therefore not missed its effect. Moreover, the failure of the Peace Conference to repair the defect or to find new remedies for a wrong thus constituted has only aggravated the suspicion and distrust with which the instrument is received in the widest circles throughout the world. And, indeed, it is not too much to say that, until the Peace Treaty is entirely revised

and the injustice and immorality eliminated therefrom, there can be no hope of the successful organization of a real League of Nations.

Thirdly, there is the fact that greatly as the Allied nations desired the participation of the United States in the carrying out of the Peace terms, they themselves made it impossible for her. For the methods they had been guilty of in their action towards China, leaving all other considerations aside, awakened a profound distrust in the American people. They could not overlook the fact that England, hitherto the universally recognized champion of fair play, and from the beginning of the war the self-constituted protector of the small and the weak nations, had made a mockery of these principles and of the principle of self-determination by making a portion of the territory of her future ally the subject-matter of a bargain with China's oppressor, Japan. Nor could the American people disregard the fact that England showed anything but good faith when she withheld knowledge of the secret treaties from America, who was at least equally interested in the fate of China, down to the very last moment (February 1919).

The American people have never had the cynical disregard for the ways of statesmen which up to very recently was so prevalent in Europe. And, accordingly, revelations such as these came as a great shock to them and had much to do with the

determination of their representatives in Congress to withdraw the country entirely from any possibility of further European entanglements.

I have thus attempted to sketch, however imperfectly, the almost annihilating effect the Shantung business has had upon the attempted World Peace of to-day. That this amazing result was not foreseen by those who were its responsible authors simply shows how deaf, dumb and blind our statesmen are with respect to the forces which, in the last analysis, really control the world. They went on their way serenely at Paris in total disregard of the moral sentiments of mankind, with the results we all know — a Peace Treaty that is respected nowhere because it has not deserved respect, a world disorganized and still at war, innumerable new causes of strife disseminated throughout the globe.

Before the Peace Conference met, President Wilson is reported to have said that the "acid test" of the ensuing Peace Treaty would be the treatment meted out to Russia. Had the Russian question come up for final determination by the Peace delegates and for inclusion in the Peace Treaty, it is possible that President Wilson would not have missed fire in his prophecy. As it stands, however, the "acid test" of the Peace Treaty turns out to be the treatment meted out to China —a quite unthinkable result before the Peace Conference met.

CHAPTER NINE

THE SHANTUNG QUESTION AND OTHER CORRUPTING EVILS

I HAVE hitherto referred only in a general way to the rights, privileges and concessions obtained by the Japanese at the expense of China in the province of Shantung. These are now to be considered more in detail.

Under the revised Japanese demands presented to China on April 26, 1915, and which the latter was compelled to accept in the following month under a threat of the use of force, Japan was granted "all rights, interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the province of Shantung." Furthermore, the Chinese Government consented that "as regards the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiao-chow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Germany is willing to abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsen line, China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate a loan."

With the lapse of time, these far-reaching priv-

ileges appearing to the Japanese not comprehensive enough to satisfy their grasping purpose, China was induced, partly by threats, partly by the corruption of officials, to sign a new secret agreement on September 24, 1918, under which the Chinese Republic was required to employ Japanese loans and Japanese technical assistance for the construction of railroads in the province of Shantung. There already existed in the province a railroad, built by the Germans during their occupation, running from the port of Tsingtao via Kiao-chow on the east to the extreme westerly borders of the province at its capital, Tsinan. From Tsinan two great railway lines branch off—one of them to the north via Tientsin to Peking, the other running south to Shanghai and thence to Hangchow and Ningpo.

It was now proposed, in the secret treaty just referred to, to permit Japan to extend the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railroad to a point nearly due west from Tsinan, namely, the town of Shunteh, in the province of Chili. Furthermore, the Japanese were to be permitted to construct a railroad connecting with the Tsingtao-Tsinan line and running in a southerly direction to Soochow, in the province of Kiangsu. In addition to the railroads already named as marked out for construction by Japan, she became the successor, confirmed by the Peace Treaty, to the German rights to the construction of the line from Chefoo to Weihsen, in

the province of Shantung, running from the centre of the province to its extreme north-eastern border on the Yellow Sea. One glance at the map is sufficient to show that with the construction of these railways, together with the control over the Tsingtao-Tsinan line, the entire province of Shantung, from north to south and from east to west, comes within the grasp of Japan. Moreover, the control over these lines will place her in the position to retain the mastery over the two main lines of railroad, already mentioned, running north and south from the junction point at Tsinan, and likewise of the railway now in course of construction and running from the coast-town Haichow, in the province of Kiangsu, to Soochow and Hangchow. In other words, the entire railway system of China will be, to a very great extent, at the mercy of Japanese railway control, exercised from the strategically central position occupied by Japanese controlled railways in Shantung province, from which vantage-ground, if the Japanese so will it, North China may be cut off from South China and East China from West China. Furthermore, the Mikado's subjects are given the right, under this agreement, to station troops in Tsinan and Tsingtao and to provide Japanese instructors to the detachments of police to whom is assigned the duty of guarding the railway-line from Tsingtao to Tsinan.

Having these considerations in mind, one is

able to understand the exceedingly small value contained in the Japanese promise to restore the Kiao-chow region to China, and the more so in view of the fact that the restoration is to be made dependent upon the grant to Japan of a concession at Tsingtao which, under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan, will practically carry with it control of the port.

In this connection it is well to remind the reader that Japan's present claims in the province of Shantung are not simply an outflow of her conquest of Kiao-chow from the Germans. On the contrary, Japan's course of procedure from the very beginning of her campaign to drive out the Germans was steeped in illegality, involving flagrant breaches of neutrality and the contravention of the rules of international law. The facts are these. In 1898 Germany acquired a lease of Kiao-chow with its port of Tsingtao from China. Soon after the outbreak of war in 1914 Japan sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding, among other things, the surrender of Kiao-chow to Japan "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." An Allied force of Japanese and British troops attacked and took Kiao-chow on November 16, 1914. The British troops, following international law, landed inside the German leased territory. The Japanese troops, on the other hand, disregarding the law, landed at Lungkow, 150 miles outside the German leased

territory. They seized the whole peninsula, with the entire railway—290 miles in length—running between Kiao-chow and Tsinan, and occupied all the stations, in spite of China's protest.

Instead of complying with China's request to withdraw her troops from the interior of Shantung after the fall of Kiao-chow, Japan presented to the President of China, Yuan Shi Kai, the famous twenty-one demands, in which she demanded the power to control China's police and finance, to officer the Chinese Army, to open China's mines and to monopolize the supply and manufacture of fire-arms. There were also other far-reaching demands to which we need not refer.

Under pressure of an ultimatum and a threat to employ force, China reluctantly gave her consent, and made it known to the world that she did so only that the peace of the Far East might be maintained at a time when all China's friends were engaged in a desperate struggle with the Central Powers. Moreover, China's rulers felt that the final settlement must rest with the Peace Conference.

In the meantime, Japan intimated to China that the only condition which would satisfy her in withdrawing was the concession of a number of railway and mining rights. In order to prevent serious trouble and to relieve the people from the pressure of Japan's oppressive measures, the Tuan Cabinet acceded to the wishes of Japan

and made a number of secret preliminary agreements, granting to Japan the privileges she demanded. But the Tuan Cabinet which made these secret agreements was discredited the moment the news leaked out and was forced to resign fifteen days after the preliminary agreements were signed.

China now asks that Kiao-chow, with the railways and mines, should be directly returned to her, and she promises to open the same to the co-operation of all friendly Powers. Her reasons for doing so are as follows:

(1) Notwithstanding the fact that the transfer of the leased territory to Germany in 1898 was not a voluntary act, nevertheless the sovereignty of China over the leased territory continued to be recognized.

(2) The inhabitants of Shantung are purely Chinese and the universal wish is to remain under China's sovereignty.

(3) Shantung is the cradle of Chinese civilization and the home of Confucius and of Meng-tse.

(4) Shantung is very densely populated, containing a population of 38,000,000 over an area of 56,000 square miles, and has, therefore, no space to offer to foreigners, whose only object in coming there is to exploit the native for their own benefit.

(5) Shantung has within her borders all the prerequisites (mining, ports, railroads) for the economic leadership in North China.

(6) Strategically, Kiao-chow controls the entrance to the Gulf of Chili and to North China.

(7) The restoration of the leased territory is a condition precedent to the maintenance of peace in the Far East, and the continuance of foreign occupation must sooner or later lead to conflict.

(8) Kiao-chow is the best natural harbour in North China, and within the zone of the Kiao-chow-Tsinan Railroad are situated two immense coalfields and an iron mine containing 40,000,000 tons of high-grade ore. On the projected southern extension of the railway are three very big coalfields, with a total reserve of over a billion tons, which are the only bituminous coalfields within economic distance of the Yangtse iron mines. Its westward extension would reach the province of Shansi, which contains some of the largest coalfields in the world. Japan already holds Dalny as her leased territory. If she holds on to Kiao-chow she will be in a position to control the whole of North China, including Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, with the latter already in her hands. She would be able to close the door of North China to any other Power, and the independence of China would be greatly impaired, if not utterly destroyed.

Indeed, we perceive in Japan's Shantung programme only one step among many that have been taken in the direction of bringing about the complete subjection of the Chinese to Japanese

influence. For example, the continuance of internal strife in China is to be attributed to the fact that the Japanese have made civil war a lucrative profession there. The Military Governors (Tuchuns) hold independent commands over hordes of uniformed coolies, and no honest effort is made to settle their differences, for the reason that these warriors stand to profit from a continuance of the internal conflict. And Japan furnishes the money.

Thus the Chinese nation is being corrupted in high places. And as if that were not enough, we find that just as well organized an attempt is being made to corrupt and demoralize the masses by promoting and facilitating the introduction into China of opium and other narcotics. The profits to the Japanese from the opium traffic in 1913 were $8,400,000, and they have increased enormously during the war.

China's long struggle against the opium traffic and habit is familiar to the world. When the Great War began, the traffic was on its last legs apparently. The Chinese Government and the Chinese people were in a way to accomplish what had seemed to be impossible, and completely to stamp out the cultivation, trade in, and use of the drug in the whole of China. All the principal Powers, including Japan, were nominally co-operating with China in this effort, and had made agreements accordingly. Then

the war came, disturbed and unsettled the administration of China, and let down all bars to Japanese "penetration." How Japanese, with the connivance and often with the actual help of the Japanese Government, took advantage of these circumstances to introduce and fasten another drug habit on the Chinese constitutes as black an action as has been charged to any nation in recent times. That some other nations have likewise a share in the blame is apparent from the following, which I quote from the *Manchester Guardian* of May 27, 1920:

"The attack which is now being made in America upon England for maintaining what is called 'Britain's opium monopoly' has led the India Office to publish a complete statement showing the quantity and value of opium grown in and exported from the Indian Empire from 1913–14 to 1918–19.

"It is not very pleasant to read, upon the authority of Mr. Montagu, that the cultivation of the poppy has grown from 144,561 acres in 1914 to 204,186 acres in 1916–17 (the latest figures available). The export values have increased enormously, but this appears to be due more to the prices obtained for opium than to an increased volume of export. At the same time the Government admits that during 1918–19 the export had increased from 8,710 chests in 1916 to 10,467 in 1919.

"The statement goes to confirm one of the principal contentions of our American critics—namely, that although Great Britain does not ship direct to China, Anglo-French friendship permits us to pass the drug through French territory. I observe that out of the total export of 10,467 chests from India, 5,190 chests were in 1919 sent to Indo-China and Siam, whilst over 2,400 chests were shipped to the island of Java. These cannot have been medical supplies. In one other respect the return gives colour at least to another American contention—that we are enabled by our friendship with Japan to pass the drug through Japanese ports. Chests of opium shipped to Japanese ports from India have nearly trebled—namely, from 799 chests in 1914 to 1,936 in 1919."

CHAPTER TEN

JAPANESE EXPANSION

So long as Russia remained a Great Power and able to resist the aggressive encroachments of Japan in Asia, the Japanese confined their operations in China's northern domains to the extension of their influence over Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. In these two regions, far-reaching claims had been forced upon China in 1915, when Japan presented the twenty-one demands for Chinese consumption. These demands included (1) the extension of the term of the lease not only of Port Arthur and Dalny, but also of the South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden Railway; (2) the granting of special privileges to Japanese as regards the ownership of land, and with respect to trade, manufacture and farming in South Manchuria; (3) the right of Japanese subjects to have civil and criminal cases in which they are defendants tried by the Japanese Consul; (4) the grant of certain special mining privileges; (5) the grant to Japanese capital of a preference in case China requires loans

for building railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; (6) the grant to Japan of a preference, in political, financial, military or police matters in case China requires foreign instructors or advisers in South Manchuria.

Under the secret agreement of September 24, 1918, China is required to build four railroads in Manchuria and Mongolia and to employ Japanese capital in their construction. This new Japanese demand, together with those referred to in the foregoing paragraph, represents the fixed Japanese policy towards China that by indirect means seeks to destroy every vestige of Chinese sovereignty in the provinces named, and under the cloak of a pretended "friendly co-operation" in economic and financial matters, in reality provides the Japanese with the right to exploit China to the utmost limit of her capacity to endure. By these means South Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia and Shantung had completely fallen under the yoke of Japan. And thus matters stood when, in the course of the year 1918, it became apparent that the Russian State was in process of disorganization and could no longer hope to oppose itself with vigour, as formerly, to the expansion politics of its Japanese neighbour in the Far East. And accordingly, at this juncture, the Nipponese stepped over into North Manchuria and into Outer Mongolia, hitherto the particular spheres of influence that belonged to Russia. Under the

pretext that the Bolshevist peril was a menace to Japanese interests in Korea and adjoining regions, Japan sent troops of occupation to the aforementioned former Russian spheres of influence, and in a very short time extended her economic and financial interests over them. Nor was this the crowning limit to her imperialistic designs. There remained for consummation the spread of Japanese influence in the great region of the Amur River, the seizure of Vladivostok and the entire Maritime Province of Russia, and the penetration of all Russian Siberia east of Lake Baikal. All of these fell into the capacious maw of Japan prior to the coming of summer in 1920. And to this end nothing could have served Japan's purposes better than the complete fiasco in which ended the expedition of the five Great Powers in Siberia, a project that had been cleverly promoted by Japan, knowing that it was doomed to failure from the very outset, but realizing that no better lesson could be given the Powers than this one that they must leave it to Japan alone to put a check on Bolshevist influences in the Far East. The five Powers came, saw and were conquered. When the last American soldier had been put aboard ship bound for home, the Japanese, who alone remained behind, were given the order to advance, and almost in a twinkling, what the five Great Powers had been unable to accomplish in combination, Japan accomplished single-handed, and

to-day her influence is paramount in North Manchuria, in Outer Mongolia, in the Amur region, in the Maritime Province, and in all Siberia east of Lake Baikal.

But it was not alone in the acquirement of influence over vast new stretches of the earth's surface that Japan showed her greatness during the war and after. It was likewise in a commercial and financial sense that Japan made good use of her time. The enormous profits that flowed into Japanese coffers as the result of the temporary cessation of European competition, due to the war, resulted in a remarkable expansion of Japanese trade, industry and shipping. New markets were acquired in Australia, the Dutch East Indies, British India, China, South America and South Africa. Immense fortunes were made in the sale of ammunition and other war supplies to the Allies. A large part of Japan's foreign debt, which prior to 1914 had been growing to huge proportions, was paid off, and still Japan had money left over in plentiful amount to invest in French, British and Russian loans. The figure reached by these loans stood at 1,151 million yen in September 1918. The Japanese gold reserve had mounted by December 1918 to a sum total of 1,093 million yen. For the first time since she emerged as a modern State Japan became a creditor instead of a debtor nation. She has brought under her influence vast new

regions comparable in area with all of Europe, and she has made such strides in industry, commerce and finance as to make her to-day a dangerous rival even of England and America. And all this has been done within the living memory of many of her statesmen. Truly a formidable giant.

Apologists for Japan in her aggressive and imperialistic designs are in the habit of citing, as a reason and excuse for Japan's expansion, the fact that it is a most serious problem for Japan to face, namely, to provide food for a population which already exceeds the limit which the country's soil can support, and which is debarred by Exclusion Acts from seeking relief in the less populated regions of America and Australia. With a birth-rate of 32 per thousand and a death-rate of 21.5 per thousand, the population increases every year by about 750,000. In the last ten years the population of Japan, excluding Korea and Formosa, has increased from 50 to 57 millions, an average of 380 to the square mile. The land under cultivation and the rice production have increased by only 5 per cent., whereas the number of inhabitants has grown by 12 per cent. So long as the present birth-rate is maintained, the nation must depend more and more upon imported food supplies, as it is claimed that the limit of tillable soil and productivity has been reached. So long as Japan can purchase the surplus food she needs

by means of a favourable balance of trade the problem may be faced. But with each yearly increase in the population there must come a corresponding increase of imported food, which in turn necessitates an increased sale of Japanese manufactured goods in foreign markets. Facing the matter, therefore, under normal conditions, it is necessary for Japan either to increase her supply of food by means of industrial expansion or to expand territorially into the less populated regions of the Asiatic Continent. In other words, Japan is overcrowded and must overflow along the line of least resistance—that is to say, into Asia. Having stated the case for Japan, we have now to consider the reasonableness of the explanation thus set forth.

Up to the outbreak of the Great War, Japan had acquired as a result of her Chinese War in 1894–5 and of her Russian War in 1904–5, vast increases of territory comprising the island of Formosa, Korea, half of the island of Saghalin, and a practical mastery of South Manchuria, which opened that vast region to Japanese enterprise and Japanese colonization to the same extent as is the case in territory entirely under Japanese sovereignty. And how did Japanese attempts at colonization turn out in these cases? Very poorly indeed, for the records show that less than 100,000 Japanese left Japan to settle permanently in these countries. Accordingly,

having learned from this experience, the Japanese will be the first to admit that they are not a colonizing race and never will be. Take Shantung. What excuse is there for Japanese territorial expansion in Shantung, which is already far more overcrowded than the Japanese Island Empire? And if Japanese efforts to colonize regions that lie close to their very doors have utterly failed, how little excuse is there for the assertion that they must take over still wider areas in order to satisfy the needs of the Island Empire's growing population. Markets they must have. Raw materials they must have. With all this we agree fully. But are these not to be had without extending Japanese sovereignty over wide tracts of land to which they have no just title? The answer is, of course, in the affirmative. Economic pressure is neither an explanation nor a justification of Japan's imperialistic designs. We must seek for the reasons elsewhere. And they are to be found, as the writer has pointed out in his former publications, in the continued exercise of irresponsible authority by the Military Party at Tokio, at the head of which is the veteran statesman and Genro, Yamagata. Authoritative Cabinet government does not exist in Japan. The Foreign Office is subservient to the War Office. The Ministers of War and of the Navy must be chosen from those respective services, and have the power to upset any Cabinet, by the simple act

of resigning, in case the civilian members thereof prove intractable to their will. Behind the War and Navy Ministries, behind the Cabinet, behind Parliament and behind the Mikado himself stand the Genro or Elder Statesmen, with Yamagata at their head. These are the men, answerable to no authority, who have the deciding voice in the conduct of Japan's policies, internal and external. Many members of the Liberal Party in Japan continue to claim that the influence of the Genro is declining. Do any of Japan's recent actions give support to this claim? One would have to be very optimistic indeed to believe such a thing. The writer believes, on the contrary, that Japan, led by the stern directing hand of her Military Party, stands only upon the threshold of her designs, which embrace all of Asia. How this is to be accomplished will be understood when we examine the rôle that China is to play in this future drama.

Japan's purpose has been to demonstrate to the Chinese that they have absolutely nothing to hope for from the Western nations. The Western nations have exploited China; they have stolen from her some of her richest territorial possessions; they forced the opium traffic upon her; they have managed her finances to a great extent for their own unjust enrichment; they have despoiled China of her riches, carried off as loot many of her art and scientific treasures; they called her

into the war as an ally, accepted most extraordinary sacrifices made in their behalf, and then abandoned her at the Peace Conference to the rapacious tyranny of her great Eastern enemy. Such is but a rough and utterly incomplete outline of what China has suffered at the hands of the Western nations.

Japan's purpose was, as stated, to prove to the Chinese people that, far from getting better treatment from the Western democratic nations, they would actually get worse treatment from them than by dealing directly with Japan alone. She will try to convince the Chinese that in future the technical and financial resources of Japan will be employed to organize and build up the Chinese Empire, rather than for its exploitation. The doctrine of "Asia for the Asiatics" will then come into its own, and the two nations, working in double harness for their own mutual interests, will show the Western nations the door. If a race war should ensue, Japan is prepared to give battle both on sea and land, and China's hordes will be armed and disciplined to make common cause against the common foe. The Military Party in Japan have resolved to attempt these things, for it is for them the only road to follow if they are to preserve to the Emperor his Imperial prerogatives and to themselves the retention of power and place, which, if any other political course is followed, will gradually slip out of

their hands and into the hands of the common people.

With multitudes of agents, sympathizers, propagandists, priests, missionaries, pedlars, etc., pouring into all parts of the country for the one purpose of converting China and pushing on an incessant campaign in favour of a Chino-Japanese Alliance, Japan and the large pro-Japanese party that already exists in China will be able to bring China to the conclusion that it will pay her best to join hands with Japan in order that together they may become the joint masters of the East.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

A CHINO-JAPANESE UNION

THERE can be no question of greater interest and importance to the Western nations than the question of Japan's future world-policy. There are some, possessing authority to speak, from whom we have recently grown accustomed to hear that Japan is at the cross-roads. They profess to believe that very soon we are to see an end of Imperialism and the policy of expansion in the Island Empire, which now has gone on its unchecked way for nearly three decades. They are confident that the invisible and irresponsible powers behind the Throne, which actually control Japan's foreign policy, will be replaced by authoritative Cabinet government.

If there were any truth or wisdom in this pronouncement, the Western world could afford to forget that there ever was such a thing as a Japanese peril and turn to the noble task of creating a new world-order, from which suspicions, alarms, wars and rumours of wars are to be entirely eliminated.

There are many considerations, however, which

compel the thoughtful observer to think otherwise about Japan's choice at the cross-roads. Indeed, if we could even for a few brief moments place ourselves in the position of the Japanese nation, we might even perceive some reasons for thinking that Japan must either go on in the old way or go under.

For centuries it has been Japan's good fortune that the people of China were not a warlike nation. Not since the days of Gengis Khan and Kublai Khan has Japan had anything to fear from the military prowess of the Chinese.

To-day the case is different. China, like all other Eastern nations, has begun to stir herself. The sleeping giant is awakening from his long slumber and, like Rip Van Winkle, he finds, on awaking, that the world has grown to be something entirely different from what it was when he retired from it. In the heyday of her might, China possessed a great art, a great literature, flourishing scientific attainments and a remarkable philosophy of life, propounded into a religion by such noble thinkers as Confucius and Meng-tse. For centuries the Japanese have been pupils at the Chinese shrine, and the best that they have in art, literature and religion they obtained from Chinese sources. Only one thing they failed to learn from their teachers, and that is how to keep the peace. But, to be just to the Japanese, that is not their fault so much as it is the fault

of the Western nations who forced Japan to open her ports under the mouths of their cannon. Persuaded by the belching fire of the guns that they must either be converted by Western ideas or be conquered by Western arms, the Japanese chose the former alternative. And now it is China's turn to make a similar choice, for the guns have been thundering continuously at her doors for decades past.

China is still vulnerable. The decaying Empire has not yet convalesced from its sleeping-sickness. The Chinese nation is beginning to reform itself, and after a republican revolution is passing through a phase of consolidation and the centralizing of its Government. Presently, it may be too strong for conquest. That is what Japan fears, and that fact is the guide-post of her imperialistic policies. And Japan prefers to merge rather than be submerged—to make common cause with the Chinese against their Western rivals who have willed it that it should be so. It is not a Yellow peril. It is a Japanese peril. Under Japanese leadership the East will be armed and equipped to stand over against the West. If China did not, in its awakening, constitute a real future menace for Japan, the Nipponese could now afford to rest on their laurels and enjoy the rich harvests they have already reaped. For it is not thinkable, except in the face of a real danger, that a nation that

is over-populated, too rapidly industrialized and taxed beyond the limits of endurance, should elect to invest half its revenues in armaments. Nor is there any economic justification for such a capital outlay except conquest.

Japan has only to convince Peking that it would pay the Chinese nation to become part of her family and the world will be brought suddenly face to face with the *fait accompli.* Japan's first step would be to place Japanese or pro-Japanese officials in every position of importance and to remove every Chinaman that showed opposition. Peking's policy would be telegraphed from Tokio. The reorganization of China's finance, customs, military and naval services would soon follow. The foreigner who, for so long, has been tolerated in China and allowed to batten on his ill-gotten gains, acquired at China's expense in her weakness, would be asked to retire to other fields, and the East would then stand for the first time in ages as a bulwark against all further Western aggression and exploitation. Indeed, if England is permitted to remain in India without interference, it will be only on condition of recognizing and offering no opposition to the new arrangement. The question of what the new Anglo-Japanese Alliance will contain, provided it is renewed, is left for later discussion. But it will be remembered that the existing amended Alliance included

India in its scope, and since the Alliance has required Japan to act in aiding to defend India in certain circumstances, the Japanese have made it the pretext for extending their influence there, and as leader and champion of the Eastern peoples, Japan stands forth in the guise of protector, to whom the existing racial and religious community of interests can no longer be a matter of indifference. This attitude of Japan's towards India has been cleverly devised with the view to strengthening Japan in her position towards China. The Great Powers would like to rescue China from Japan. England, however, the only Power that could be expected to take the initiative in this direction, must decline to do so on account of India.

In judging of the strength of this movement looking towards the union of the Yellow races under Japanese leadership, a number of factors, usually overlooked in the West, must be given consideration. Mention has already been made of the Military Party in Japan, whose ambitions rest upon an historical basis and are founded upon the teachings of Japan's greatest educators since the early part of the eighteenth century. Partly to realize these ambitions, from patriotic motives, and partly to retain for themselves their position of power and privilege, the Military Party have exerted themselves, since the organization of the Island Empire as a modern State,

to instil the spirit of Imperialism and self-confidence into the people, and to lead their minds away from the ideas of democracy and social reform. Every war thus far waged by Japan has aided greatly in the accomplishment of these ends. The idea of a world mission has been propagated and permitted to grow to such proportions that it is fair to say one would have difficulty in finding many, even among the educated classes, who are free from its influence. The idea of race superiority is as firmly fixed in the national consciousness as is the doctrine of the divine descent of the Emperor; and the Shinto worship of the upper classes, with its suggestion of divine direction and control, has exercised a most potent influence upon the lower classes as well. Like the Hebrews of old, the Japanese look upon themselves as a chosen people, whose destiny it is to lead the nations to a higher and nobler fate. Moreover, the contemptuous attitude of the West towards Orientals has done much to stiffen the Japanese desire for world dominion. To carry out his plans, he must first demonstrate his superior military power, and this he can only do when he has been accepted as the leader of the Eastern nations and has succeeded in applying to them his methods of efficiency. With China under Japanese tutelage, the rest would be easy.

Events since the outbreak of the war have greatly aided the Japanese in their designs upon

China. The complete absorption of the other Great Powers in Europe afforded Japan a golden opportunity to promote her plans unhindered. And the very uncertainty as to the outcome of the struggle which lasted until the autumn of 1918 made it all the easier to escape the opposition of her European competitors. The United States, standing alone, could only protest for the time being, and besides, the American Government was convinced that China's wrongs would be righted by the Peace Conference. But it was just here that Japan's impregnable position in Asia, in the face of the entire concert of the Powers, became clear to China for the first time. President Wilson's abandonment of his principles was a disillusionment to China such as a nation seldom experiences, and her statesmen saw themselves the dupe of a belief in Western principles of fair play. President Wilson's weakness, moreover, betrayed a lack of political insight remarkable in the head of a State who possessed every facility in the world for correct information and advice. And the blow thus dealt by President Wilson to China's future destinies may be fraught with consequences that will be of concern to the farthest ages. For the bankruptcy of his principles and of the League of Nations idea, upon which China had built all her hopes, has brought the union of China and Japan a long stride nearer, if, indeed, it has not made it inevitable.

What has served to undermine Chinese belief in the good faith of the Western Powers still more is the recognition given in the Covenant of the League of Nations to "regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine." By "regional understandings" are to be understood policies such as that of Austria, before the war, clashing with the similar policy of Russia, with respect to the Balkan States; or such as the policy of England, clashing until yesterday with the similar policy of Russia, towards Persia and Afghanistan; or such a policy as Japan's with respect to Northeastern Asia.

Much as these policies or understandings differ from the Monroe Doctrine, they all have this in common with it, namely, the insistence by some strong Power that no other strong Power shall extend its control into zones where such extension is imputed as a threatened danger to the interests of the first Power. And in all such cases the larger part of the menace which is feared proceeds upon the theory that the older interests may be attacked by the arms of the incoming sovereignty.

Japan has already procured from the United States in the Ishii-Lansing Agreement a recognition of her "special interests" in China. England and the other Allied Powers have recognized those special interests by their action in the Shantung question and by their failure to call for the annulment of the twenty-one demands. By

these various steps, therefore, Japan has undoubtedly succeeded in creating a "regional understanding" with respect to China, and by virtue of Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the validity thereof is no longer subject to attack on the part of those nations who subscribe to the Covenant. And, indeed, should the United States, which is not a member of the League, undertake to attack its validity, then Article 17 of the Covenant comes into play, and if the United States refuses arbitration thereunder and resorts to war, then the provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant become pertinent, involving application of the blockade by all the other members of the League and the use of armed force, if necessary, until America is reduced to submission.

Accordingly, it is not to be wondered at if the Chinese look upon the Covenant of the League of Nations as an instrument for their undoing. Their refusal to sign the Peace Treaty was, therefore, in effect merely a last effort to save their independence; and, severe as the lesson was for them, it was an illuminating one. The absolute lack of good faith of the allied nations stood forth in all its nakedness. Only the action of the United States Senate saved America from being involved in the same dishonour, and if the American people can only be brought to understand that fact, constitutional government and the cause of

democracy will have been greatly strengthened in the Union.

Other factors of importance which will aid greatly in the creation of a Chino-Japanese union are the existence in China of a large and influential pro-Japanese Party and the existing chaos in her finances. The pro-Japanese Party is to be found, for the most part, in the north of China, and numbers a great many of the military leaders among its adherents. While it is true that Japan has advanced a great deal of money in secret loans to these elements, giving colour to the oft-repeated charge of widespread corruption among them, it is nevertheless a fact that many leading Chinese favour the union on purely patriotic grounds. They sincerely believe that no other way lies salvation for China.

The disorganization of her finances has been due to a variety of causes. The revolution in China brought with it a great deal of civil dissension, out of which arose the setting up in each province of a Home Rule government in the hands of a Tuchun or Military Governor. Centralized government ceased to exist; the Tuchuns made war on one another, while at the same time suffering from the ravages of civil war at home. Each of these Tuchuns maintained an army, to a great extent supported by foreign loans. Such a condition of things naturally lent itself easily to the intrigues of any foreign Power that wished

to take advantage of the situation. Until these armies are disbanded there would seem to be little hope of improving the condition of China's finances. Japan is, of course, in a position to profit most by these conditions, and in the existing Four-Power Consortium for relieving the financial needs of China, Japan will naturally, from her position and interests, take the leading part. England and France may be somewhat embarrassed by their own pressing needs at home, which leaves the United States to hold the bag with Japan. The latter country, having already secured a first lien on China's most profitable tax-producing means, is thus in a position to exercise a controlling voice in the disposition of whatever assets remain.

Thus we perceive a net spread about China from which it will be difficult for her to escape. Nor is it a matter entirely free from doubt, under present conditions, whether it is desirable for her to escape.

It is, however, another question whether the great Western Powers, including Russia, can afford in their own selfish interests (leaving moral considerations out of the question) to permit such a union to be consummated between the Yellow races. It is surely fraught with many future perils, and the immediate effect of it would no doubt be disastrous in its economic aspects.

If anything is to be done to forestall China's

doom, it must be done without much delay. Peace with Russia is an immediate necessity. Then must follow the creation of the only possible alliance that can save the Chinese Empire, namely, Great Britain, America, Germany and Russia.

CHAPTER TWELVE

BRITAIN'S CHANGE OF POLICY IN ASIA

THE Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty, which expires nominally on July 13, 1921, contains a self-extending clause, as follows: "In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it."

At the present writing it seems altogether unlikely that the treaty will be renewed. Ordinarily, negotiations for its renewal would now be under way, and the fact that they have not taken place speaks volumes. For Britain is beginning to have some doubts of the wisdom of her policy, which, though successful in weakening Russian and German influence in Asia, has created in their stead a far more dangerous opponent of British power and prestige on the Asiatic Continent than either of the others could ever hope to be.

Indeed, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has altogether been a costly affair for Britain. Its effect has been to establish, by slow but steady stages, Japanese paramountcy in China, and its ultimate effect may be even more far-reaching. Step by step, British diplomacy retreated before the Japanese onslaught. Let us examine briefly how it was done.

In 1907–8 British-American interests received concessions from China for the construction of two lines of railway in Manchuria. Without going into particulars, they were known as the Fakumen and the Chinchow-Aigun railway projects. Japan objected to the construction of these railroads, and induced Russia to join her in objecting to the Chinchow-Aigun Railroad, on the ground that they would compete with the Manchurian railways under their control and that the leasehold rights under which they held protected them against such competition. Without attempting to go into the merits of the case, suffice it to say that this contention was warmly disputed in England and America, and in China, also, the claim was considered to be without sufficient justification. Nevertheless, the Japanese veto was upheld by the British Foreign Office.

In Manchuria, Japan likewise asserted her right to establish innumerable other regulations, designed to close out British and American competition, in connection with the administration

of the railway zone and of the ports of entry in South Manchuria. Indeed, from the beginning of her occupation Japan indicated that she held herself in a position of superior advantage and privilege in the matter of industry and trade, and that, in despite of the principle of the "Open Door" and equal opportunity to all nations, she was invested with the right to regulate the activities of other nations who sought to obtain any benefits or to conduct any enterprise for profit in this exclusively Japanese sphere of influence. And again the British Foreign Office acquiesced.

In 1909, Secretary Knox made his famous proposal for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways under international control. The effect of this, if accepted, would have been to secure for China the enjoyment of her political rights in Manchuria and to promote the normal development of her eastern provinces. It would have put an end to the constantly arising disagreements among the Powers with respect to the policy of the "Open Door" and trade with China.

The Chinese Government assented to the proposal. Russia and Japan rejected it, the moving spirit, however, being, as always, Japan. The British Foreign Office, which was supposed by Secretary Knox to be in accord with him in the proposal, in reality took its cue from Japan and failed to back up the Knox plan. Thus China's

wishes were disregarded and Japan was permitted to flout the plain provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty. Henceforth, with England's approval, China was to be denied the right to decide upon the course of railway development within her territory, and Japan's strategical and political interests were recognized as paramount in planning a railway system within China's territory. Moreover, Japan now had the right to decide who would finance, construct and operate railways within China's territory and to veto arrangements with respect to these matters which China wished to carry out.

In this connection, it may perhaps remove any still remaining doubt in the reader's mind with respect to the above conclusions if I recall the fact that in still another part of China, far away from Treaty Ports and all acknowledged spheres of influence of foreign Powers, an American syndicate proposed to construct railways 1,500 miles in length, the principal being from Feng Chen in Mongolia to Kansu, on the remote western borders. It promised great economic results. It had no connection whatever with politics. It was solely a work of development. This project, like all the others we have mentioned, fell under the ban of the Japanese Government. The American protest was unheard. The Japanese veto held good, for England stood with Japan.

Korea since 1883, and up to the time of her

annexation by Japan in 1910, was always considered more or less of a protégé of America. Missions and schools were established there by American philanthropic and religious circles, and there had grown up a close feeling of sympathy and regard in America for their Korean beneficiaries. The fate of Korea could, accordingly, never be a matter of indifference to Americans, and when Japan carried through her ruthless annexation plans in 1910, involving the complete subjection of the Korean nation, American circles were deeply moved. And here again we perceive the hand of Britain, for Korea's fate had been sealed in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance of 1905, under which Korea is dealt with as follows:

"Article III.—Japan possessing paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests. . . ."

Britain's acquiescence in Japan's designs upon Korea, equally with her assent to the granting of a free hand to Japan and Russia in Manchuria and Mongolia, was an indication that she was moving in the direction of a complete abandonment of the "Open Door" policy, whereas the rejection of Secretary Knox's plan, the greatest

and wisest proposal that has ever been made to assist China in her struggle to preserve her autonomy, is convincing evidence of her complete surrender to Japan in the Far East. But as there are always bound to be doubters, let us examine some further evidence of England's strange yielding to Japan in Far Eastern questions.

In the province of Fukien an American firm had secured a contract to build a dry-dock for China. It was purely a commercial project and had no political significance. As soon as Japan heard of the matter, she lodged a vigorous protest with the State Department at Washington. Not having been consulted in the matter, or asked to participate, she warned the State Department that unless the project was dropped Japan would regard the assent of the American Government as an unfriendly act. Japan's viewpoint prevailed. But not content with her success in opposing the project in question, Japan now set to work to make her veto on all similar projects permanent, by causing to be inserted in the twenty-one demands imposed on China in 1915 an article to the effect that China is to grant to no other Power than Japan any concession for a shipyard, coaling station or similar establishment, and to permit no private establishment of the kind with foreign capital.

While it is true that it may be claimed that the dry-dock project concerned the United States

alone and not Britain, in reality it is not so. For the State Department's final decision to bow to the Japanese decree was influenced, if not exclusively dictated, by the knowledge that the British Foreign Office was not opposed to the Japanese stand, and that America would be playing a lone hand if she insisted on her rights in the matter.

With Britain, moreover, rests the chief responsibility that Japan has had her will over China in the matter of Shantung, for it was under the initiative of England that the other Allied Powers signed the secret agreement of February–March 1917, agreeing to support Japan's claims on Shantung at the Peace Conference. It was upon England's initiative in this, as in most other inter-Allied matters, for the reason that Britain, as the foremost nation in the Western coalition, was in a position, by reason of her military, naval and financial strength, to impose her guidance upon the other allied nations in all questions which did not affect any vital interests of her allies, and, of course, in the Far East England's interests were superior to those of any other Western nation.

Up to 1915 British commercial interests in the Far East looked on, astounded and somewhat exasperated, at what they perceived was a constant sacrifice of their interests to the interests of Japan, and they asked themselves what compensations Britain was getting. I say "up to 1915,"

for up to that time these British commercial interests had grown firm in the belief that Britain was playing to retain her position of exclusive privileges in the Yangtse Valley, and was sacrificing her position elsewhere because of the necessity of making concessions to the vigorous Japanese onslaughts. Accordingly, it was expected that in return for England's complacency elsewhere, Japan would at least respect her paramount position in the Yangtse Valley and in South China.

Not so, however. For in 1915 and 1916 Japan laid her hands upon the chief British enterprises in this region, notably the Han-Yeh-Ping Iron and Coal Company, and, what is more, made the permanency of her control over the mines and other important enterprises in this region a matter of negotiation with China, and accordingly we find the matter treated and disposed of, with Japanese particularity, in Section III of the twenty-one demands presented to China in 1915. It is true that in the revised demands which were actually imposed on China in May 1915, the original demands with respect to the Yangtse Valley were somewhat modified. But this did not take away from the purpose of the Japanese Government to supersede British influence in the Yangtse Valley. Nor, so far as is known, has the British Government ever protested against the demands. Only the American Government did so.

One further instance of Japan's interference

where foreign Governments have sought to interest themselves in the affairs of China is to be found in the history of the Four-Power Loan. After the revolution and the establishment of republican government in China, the so-called Four-Power financial group, composed of British, American, French and German bankers, responding to the request of the Chinese Government, undertook to make financial advances for immediate use, pending the issue of a large covering loan. China needed money for internal administration and for internal improvements and developments. Without foreign help it was an utter impossibility for the Chinese Treasury to meet its already existing obligations, to say nothing of the programme of internal reform and administration with which the new Government proposed to inaugurate its official career.

The ensuing negotiations with the Four-Power group continued for nearly a year and were attended by various developments which it is beyond our purpose to go into. Arrangements for the loan had proceeded to quite an advanced stage, when Japan decided it was about time to interfere. Accordingly, she procured Russia to join with her in a demand to be included in the group. The request was objectionable, coming at the time it did, for the reason that it raised a hitch in the negotiations at a moment when China was in crying need of funds, and for the further reason

that neither Japan nor Russia had, at the time, any free capital to invest. Moreover, Japan's objection put political questions to the fore, particularly with respect to the use of any part of the loan for the promotion of industrial enterprises in Manchuria. Thus, as Japan put it, the Russian and Japanese spheres of influence would be encroached upon. The Four-Power bankers, realizing the complications that would ensue, immediately recognized the inadvisability of admitting Russian and Japanese participation in a loan agreement which they had striven to make of a purely commercial character. The British Foreign Office, however, true to its new Asiatic policy, exerted its influence in favour of accepting the Japanese proposal. China, the United States and Germany were opposed to it. But the British view finally prevailed, and the result was precisely what the Four-Power bankers had apprehended. Complications were at once made. Russia and Japan, mutually supporting one another, wanted a stipulation in the reorganization loan that those Powers must be consulted about any provisions and expenditures in Manchuria and Mongolia. Discord arose among the group bankers. Many conferences were held, but it seemed impossible to arrive at a definite understanding. The American representatives, with the approval of the American Government, refused to participate further if any restrictions were placed on China's

autonomy and the principle of the "Open Door." Finally, after months of haggling, the Six-Power group reached an understanding. But the delay, aside from its other unpleasant issues, had one unexpected result. A new Administration had, in the meantime, come into power in Washington, and President Wilson was averse to American participation on the ground that the reorganization loan touched the internal affairs of China, and, accordingly, the American bankers had to withdraw as participants in the loan. Thus China lost the benefit of an influence that would have been of the utmost service to her, not only in maintaining the "Open Door" policy, but in creating a wider international market for Chinese investments. Moreover, American participation would have greatly ameliorated foreign pressure upon the conduct of China's internal affairs. China's evil genius, however, had, with British support, scored another point.

From the foregoing pages, it must be clear to the reader that Britain, since her *rapprochement* with France (1904) and Russia (1907), has had a policy in Asia which, even to many thoughtful Englishmen, has seemed to border on the mysterious. Inquiring minds are unable to arrive at a reasonable conclusion with respect to what advantages Britain has received or expects to receive by reason of her continued and uninterrupted support of the Japanese programme in

Asia. It is true, as has been stated, that the Treaty of Alliance runs out in 1921. But it is self-extending, and the failure to renew it or to denounce it before a balance of account has been struck between Britain and Japan gives rise to surmises that the treaty contains secret clauses which it is in the interest of neither nation to make public, but which have some bearing on Britain's past and future policy in Asia. And, indeed, it is the uncertainty with respect to this fact which may make it difficult for other nations to work together with Britain in negotiating for a future policy in the Far East.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

As has already been indicated in the foregoing chapter, the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is already a moot point, and in considering the probabilities and possibilities thereof, it will be well to consider some new aspects of the subject which have arisen since the last Treaty of Alliance was signed in 1911.

In the first place, it must be borne in mind that aside from putting a check on the aggressive tendencies of Russia in Asia, and aside from the aid and protection given to Britain's European policy after 1907, the main purpose of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance was to protect and preserve the integrity of China as an independent state and to maintain therein the principle of the "Open Door" for the commerce of all nations on a footing of equality.

Accordingly, any renewal of the Alliance which failed to emphasize and safeguard this principle and to insist upon its equitable application would not only be useless from the British point

of view, but a certain source of trouble in the future. In Japan, on the contrary, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is now regarded, in many respects, as a hindrance rather than as an advantage, because of the possible restrictions that may flow out of it upon Japanese policy in China, due to its fundamental clash with British interests there. Thus far Japan has managed to have her way, in spite of the restrictions of the treaty. But in doing so she has made herself an object of suspicion and distrust in British Government circles, which may in the end go far to offset any gains that have been acquired at a time when Britain was not in a position to oppose her full strength to the Japanese encroachments. For in Great Britain it is at present realized that she has paid more for the Alliance than it was worth to her.

We must now consider what are the central facts in the actual situation in the Far East that have a bearing upon the question of the renewal of the treaty. These may be summed up as follows:

(1) A lack of centralization in the government of China. Discord and dissension among the governing forces or those able to govern have made it possible for Japan to acquire a position of ascendancy. China's financial difficulties have been exploited by Japan in a manner to strengthen her hold on the various factions who rule, or

pretend to rule, in the contending sections and provinces of China. There being no regular revenues, the Peking Government has been compelled to negotiate foreign loans, for the most part in Japan, who, in each instance of a new loan, manages to attach such terms and conditions as will tighten the hold she already has on the economic and financial resources of China and will make it difficult for that unhappy country to free itself from a financial incubus that threatens to stifle its very national existence.

(2) The first condition of a restoration to healthful conditions in China must be to free her government from the shackles that bind it to Japan. There are enough independent elements, a sufficiently large ruling class, in China, and a well-enough organized body of administrative functionaries to successfully conduct a free government. But China must really be free to act for herself. So long as the shadow of Japan hovers over the land, there can be little hope of reconstruction and centralization along really democratic lines.

(3) Under no consideration should there be any attempt at foreign intervention. Foreign intervention has brought China to what she is to-day, namely, a land torn by faction, verging on bankruptcy, impotent to oppose force by force, a complex of divergent tendencies that are not permitted to unite or to attain uniformity. A

virile, intelligent, thrifty and hard-working people have been rendered impotent to realize and put forth their full strength. They have in turn been hoodwinked, bargained with, coerced by force of arms, lied to, cheated, and even drugged and narcotized in order to keep them in leading-strings, to bind them to the paying of tribute to their unscrupulous oppressors, and to prevent them from rousing themselves from their slumbers and throwing off their tormentors. Indeed, what the Far East, and in particular China, needs is a fresh breeze, perhaps a cyclone, to drive out the poisonous gases which threaten to destroy its very life.

(4) Any attempt to establish a consortium of the Powers, to attend to the financial needs of China, will play into the hands of Japan, unless at the same time measures are taken to prevent unnecessary interference in the administrative processes of China. It would, if established without the proper safeguards, simply mean the organization of a committee, representing certain of the Great Powers, with a Japanese chairman and Japanese influence predominant thereon throughout. It would mean another opportunity for Japan, under the guise of exercising international control, to strengthen her mastery over China and to make that country entirely subservient to her interests and leadership.

(5) The newly created world situation demands

that increased recognition be given to the fact that the negotiations for a renewal of the Alliance would be entirely out of harmony with the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations. That the hour is approaching when the Chinese Republic, with its 400,000,000 inhabitants, will decide between a close offensive and defensive alliance with Japan and representation as an independent Power (restored to all its rights of sovereignty, which have been seriously impaired by the actions and measures of Japan and other Great Powers) in the League of Nations. That the Chinese Republic having become a member of the League of Nations (by signing the Treaty of St.-Germain, with Austria) is in a position to demand that the principles of the Covenant be applied to it as to any other independent signatory Power, and that China cannot, as formerly, be brought within the scope of any international agreement, on the lines of the existing Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty, without offending the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations. That it is now squarely up to the Western nations to decide what course they are in future to pursue towards China, namely, whether they shall apply the principles of the League of Nations to China, and, therefore, defend and protect her independence and territorial integrity, or whether they shall betray these principles, and with them the League of

Nations, by returning to the old methods of pillage and exploitation.

The foregoing are the outstanding facts that will have to be weighed carefully by the British Foreign Office before coming to any definite conclusions with respect to the renewal of the treaty. The inclination is, perhaps, present, in view of many still undetermined factors elsewhere, for Britain to allow the whole business of the treaty to rest a while, and even to permit the Alliance to run on unrevised under the self-extending clauses of the treaty. If so, such a course is certain to perpetuate many difficulties under which British commerce suffers and will seriously prejudice British prestige in the eyes of the Chinese. Indeed, the Chinese have witnessed with astonishment the apparent complacency which up to now has been displayed by the British, in the face of the fact that the spirit of the Alliance has been broken in so many important particulars, as witness the mockery of the so-called "Open Door" policy in Manchuria, the abuse of trade-marks, the innumerable petty loans to Peking which have wasted China's resources and kept the country in perpetual unrest, and the uncertainty of Japan's future action with respect to the province of Shantung.

If we look now at the attitude of the Japanese towards the treaty, we find that the chief enthusiasm for a renewal is to be found among

those whose principal fear is lest Japan find herself politically isolated in world diplomacy. For them, the renewal of the Alliance is desirable for the one reason, if for no other, that thereby Japan may show the world that the many signs which have been pointing recently to the political isolation of Japan are completely without meaning. The Japanese sensitiveness to the judgment of the outside world, in this regard, may be a powerful factor in England's hands to secure such a revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as will render her position with respect to China somewhat stronger and that of Japan somewhat weaker. If Britain should decide upon a revision of the treaty along lines which respected Chinese rights, the Liberal Party in Japan would be her ally in such a diplomatic move, but the question is, whether the growth of Liberalism in Japan has yet attained to such proportions as to constitute a sufficient check on the Imperialism of the ruling classes. The result of the recent elections would seem to indicate the contrary. We may, therefore, conclude that as yet the militaristic elements in the political life of Japan will continue to steer a course of adventure and expansion in world politics and that they will try to offset the possible advantages of a new Anglo-Japanese Alliance by pointing out the disadvantages to Japan's world position in case she yields too much for the sake of securing the British signature to

a new treaty that may carry with it greater hindrances than benefits. In other words, the leaders of Japanese *Real Politik* deny that Japan can obtain as great substantial material advantages from such a treaty as she can obtain if she goes on playing a lone hand, unembarrassed by any treaty obligations.

Japan is a member of the League of Nations, but the ties which bind her to it are of the lightest, and she is in much the same position, with respect thereto, as Germany, who is able to choose whether she will throw in her commercial and industrial future with the League or with America, which is outside the League.

Similarly, Japan might try to resolve all difficulties with America and, dependent as she is on the latter country for much of her raw material, make a virtue of necessity and close a very tight agreement with both America and Germany. Both of these countries afford great markets for Japanese manufactured goods, and both of them produce, in large measure, what Japanese industry and trade require. Such an understanding would rest upon purely financial and economic grounds and have as a basis for its existence over a measurable term of years the calling of a truce with respect to all outstanding controversies, the countries recognizing the paramount need of the world to get back to work and restore prosperity to the peoples before engaging themselves in new

disputes over political questions of prestige, power and expansion which will lead to more wars.

As the writer sees it, the only other successful alternative for England, as against such a working together of America, Japan and Germany, would lie in the combination already referred to in these pages, namely, America, England, Germany and Russia.

For it is only a question of time, and of a much shorter time than is generally supposed, when Germany will regain her old position of Britain's most active competitor. The recent war has demonstrated that it is more costly to attempt to destroy such a competitor than it is to try to live on good terms with him, under a policy of give and take, live and let live. Those who are the first to learn the lessons of the war in this regard will also be the first to restore prosperity to their own ruined fortunes.

It is undoubtedly true that very little can, with any degree of certainty, be forecasted with respect to future Anglo-Japanese relations, without some knowledge of what Japan's policy is to be and the reaction of the United States thereto. If negotiations for a removal or revision of the Alliance are commenced, Britain will, of course, be guided, to a very great extent, by the views her statesmen entertain with respect to these questions. Nor will they venture to lose sight of the fact that the events of the last five years

have been full of portents that point the way of future trouble between Great Britain and Japan. Those who think otherwise confine their arguments to the fact that Japan is apparently concerning herself only with matters in the North Pacific and China, where the extent of her "special interests" is less a question of dispute than are her claims in other directions. But those who hold to the opinion that the Japanese will, in the future, by no means be content with the playing of a partial or subordinate rôle in the Pacific, conceding to Britain and America a share in the division of spheres of influence, point out that if Japanese interests lie wholly in the North Pacific, it is hard to understand why she has come southward more than 3,000 miles to the Marshall and Caroline Islands and to the French islands (the Loyalty and Marquesas groups), less than 1,500 miles from the eastern coast of Australia.

Before the new or revised Anglo-Japanese Alliance becomes a fixed fact, there must surely come a clearing up of certain points which, as yet, are obscure both to Australians and to Americans. So far as the former are concerned, their demand is that Japan give a definite guarantee to confine her operations to the North Pacific and that she assent to the recognition of Australia as a white man's country exclusively.

On the other hand, America will always see in an Anglo-Japanese Alliance a possible menace

to her interests, and nothing can ever remove the fear of such a menace from the minds and hearts of Americans except a declaration contained in the treaty itself that in no circumstances is the Alliance aimed at America, and that in the event of a Japanese conflict, into which America may be drawn, England does not obligate herself to join with Japan or to take sides in any way against the United States.

So long as such a guarantee is left out of future agreements between England and Japan, just so long will Americans, even though they be true friends of both countries, harbour suspicions which cannot fail to weaken those cordial relations between States which are the chief and most valuable elements of future international concord. Nor should these guarantees be confined to an assurance as regards America alone. Holland in her East Indies and France in her South Asian and Southern Pacific possessions have likewise an interest in knowing that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance does not concern itself with matters antagonistic to the maintenance of the *status quo*.

Secret diplomacy stands under condemnation by the peoples of the world, and Governments would do well to remember that, in future, peoples will not so easily allow themselves to be dragged into wars, the seeds of which have been sown by those who refuse to listen to the awakened voice of humanity.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

WITH respect to the course which Anglo-Japanese relations are to take in the future, there is one very important possibility that it will scarcely do to ignore. Thus far, in discussing the probabilities of an Anglo-Japanese renewal of the Treaty of Alliance, the writer has based his conjectures upon what might be termed the normal factors in international relations. They are the factors such as we have grown accustomed to from long usage and tradition, such as, for example, that civilized nations will not employ barbarous methods in making war and will respect the usual usages of war; that they will not employ savages or semi-civilized tribes to make war on other civilized nations or to occupy their territory with such troops; that civilized nations will no longer engage in the slave-trade or, what is equally bad, compel their savage or semi-civilized subjects by methods that are repulsive to humanity to serve in their conscript armies; that an inferior

civilization, like the African, shall not be put in a position where it may become a menace to the higher civilization of the White man or the Yellow man.

Such are some of the normal factors in international relations that we have learned to honour and observe in times that are past. But we have seen them all violated in the past six years. Moreover, the guilty ones are confined to no one group of the belligerent Powers, and some of the worst of the violations were committed after hostilities had ceased.

Bearing these facts in mind, the purport of which simply is that precedents, usages and traditions (even though they are of the kind which all the moral forces of mankind approve) no longer possess any power to hold our minds in thrall, we may, perhaps, be compelled to revise some of our conclusions, or, at least, to give consideration to certain possibilities which, under the old normal conditions, we should reject as crude and fanciful.

And among such possibilities is that of an Anglo-Japanese Alliance the terms of which will include a sharing of the Asiatic Continent and of all the Russias between the two allied nations.

If the foregoing suggestion seems at all fantastic to the reader, let him bethink that Japan and Britain, by slow and quiet stages, have

already seized upon and now control all the approaches to Russia, China and the Asiatic Continent.

Russia and China together are potentially the most important commercial fields in the world. All the world wishes to trade with them. But Japan has occupied Eastern Siberia and together with Britain controls all the strategic approaches to China from the east—Dalny, Tsingtau, the Luchu Islands, Formosa, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Straits of Malacca. On the west and south, Britain now controls all the approaches to Russia and the Asiatic Continent—Gibraltar, the Dardanelles, Suez, Egypt, Aden, the Persian Gulf, East Africa, the Cape of Good Hope. On the north, Britain controls the approaches to Russia by reason of her command of the sea, her control of the Baltic and its approaches, and from the naval base she is creating for herself at Danzig. Thus we perceive that foreign trade can only enter Russia by passing through a Japanese zone on the east and a British zone on the north, west and south. Moreover, a glance at the map will prove to the reader that Japanese occupation of Siberia east of Lake Baikal, together with the existing occupation of Manchuria by Japan, provides that country, to use a wrestler's expression, with a "half-Nelson" hold on the Northern Provinces of China. Japan's occupation of Eastern Siberia is, accordingly, a move directed not

only against Russia, but against China. Indeed, no action that Japan has taken, since the inauguration of her imperial policy of expansion, more loudly proclaims her intentions as regards China and the Asiatic Continent than this occupation, with British approval, of Siberia east of Lake Baikal. For here, if anywhere, Chinese interests are paramount, in view of the fact that China and Siberia are contiguous on a land frontier extending for thousands of miles and that the Eastern Siberian region is traversed by the Siberian Railroad, which also runs for a thousand miles through Chinese territory, where it is known as the Chinese Eastern Railway. This great avenue of communication, the overland connection between Europe and the shores of the Pacific, has now, so far as its entire Eastern section is concerned, fallen a prey to the Japanese. China, who sought, after the breakdown in the Russian governmental functions after the Revolution, to take over from Russia the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, by reason of her reversionary ownership therein, has been ruthlessly pushed aside by Japan. Making use of the alleged menace of Bolshevism, Japanese military authorities at once assumed a superior authority over the officers of Chinese troops that had been sent to maintain order in those localities. The Chinese commanders in Manchuria showed firmness in maintaining that they controlled in Chinese territory

and in refusing to yield authority there to the Japanese. This situation led to many clashes between Chinese and Japanese troops. Japanese troops moved along the Chinese Eastern Railway, placing guards at all bridges, culverts and stations. As Chinese guards had already been stationed at those points, maintaining the operation of the line in absolute safety, it became apparent that the Japanese object was political and that this demonstration of force by the Mikado's military authorities would soon be followed by the complete occupation of Manchuria and of Eastern Siberia, together with the railroads. China was permitted to take no part in these operations, although they were taking place in Chinese territory and Chinese interests were affected to a much greater extent than those of any other nation. Japan's occupation became complete and undisputed after the breakdown in the joint Allied and American intervention programme, and the failure to make good of the Stevens Commission, under which the Chinese Eastern and Siberian Railways were to be operated under joint international control. The difficulties raised by Japan were, of course, responsible for the failure of both these ventures.

Now, it so happens that Japanese military occupation of Eastern Siberia is coexistent and coextensive with the similar advance on the part of Britain on the other side. Japan's military oc-

cupation on the east is paralleled by Britain's naval occupation on the west, in the Baltic and the Dardanelles. Accordingly, if these two Empires should effect a combination for mutual security of their gains, it is evident what will be the fate of Russia and China.

For America, this question is one of vital importance. Outside of the fact that the existence of such an Alliance, directed towards an interference with the free play of forces in China and Russia, would eventually result in stifling the democratic movements which have arisen in those countries, America has an interest in the matter which might even extend to the point where it would have to consider the same as a menace to her security.

Moreover, from the commercial point of view the menace is a serious one. For Japan's commercial policy in the parts of China which she already has penetrated, and Britain's policy of commercial penetration of weaker nations, gives sufficient intimation of what such zones on each side of Russia and China would mean to American and all other foreign trade.

There is, again, a distinct danger to be apprehended by America, aside from the political and other dangers already alluded to. We refer to the probability that Japan, backed by England, will seize the occasion of such an alliance to make a direct attack on the Monroe Doctrine. Then

there is the Panama Canal, the one waterway of international importance which is not already under Britain's control.

There have been not a few political observers who have doubted whether the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had any possible application to the United States. All the more so, when in the last Alliance treaty a provision was included to the effect that "Should either of the High Contracting Parties conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall impose on such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such an arbitration treaty is in force."

Such a treaty of general arbitration was in fact negotiated with Great Britain by President Taft in 1911, but the same failed of ratification in the Senate. There is, therefore, no existing provision in any Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance which excludes the possibility of Britain participating with Japan in a war against the United States. On the other hand, what positive evidence is there that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance does apply to the United States? Some of this evidence has already been alluded to, in another connection, in a previous chapter, but it will, perhaps, add something to the clarity of the present discussion if we recapitulate our proofs once again.

We must first consider what conclusions are to be drawn from the changed and still changing relations between Britain and Japan as evidenced by the modifications which were made in each new treaty as it was signed. There have been three alliances—the first signed in 1902, which was superseded by one signed in 1905, which in turn was amended in 1911.

In the first treaty, which was signed prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, it was provided that Britain should come to the assistance of Japan in case of an attack on Japan in which a second Power should join as aggressor. The alliance also guaranteed the independence of Korea and of China. It is thus apparent that the first alliance anticipated the Russo-Japanese War. The alliance assured Japan that when she joined battle with Russia she would be protected by Great Britain against attack by any other Power. In other words, Britain guaranteed that Japan would have to deal with but one adversary.

When the second alliance was made in 1905, of course things had changed. Japan had defeated Russia and was in occupation of Korea and Manchuria. Accordingly, the scope of the treaty was now widened, and whereas in the first treaty Britain's engagement was limited to "maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the

Empire of Korea," in the second treaty Britain's engagement was enlarged to include "the consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India." Furthermore, Japan was now granted a free hand in Korea, an accompanying memorandum by Lord Lansdowne, Minister of Foreign Affairs, stating that "it has become evident that Korea, owing to its close proximity to the Japanese Empire and its inability to stand alone, must fall under the control and tutelage of Japan." And, finally, the scope of the second treaty was widened by making British assistance to Japan in case of war conditional upon an attack by a *single* Power. In other words, notice to the world to keep "hands off" Japan. The bonds between the two nations were accordingly getting tighter.

To the impartial observer it must be clear that the inclusion of India within the scope of the second treaty is the keynote of the whole enterprise so far as Britain was concerned. Britain had been the only nation which from the very first had formed a correct estimate of Japanese ambitions and of Japan's capacity to realize those ambitions. British policy at this time followed two aims—firstly, to weaken Russia in the Far East and then, that having been accomplished, Britain was prepared to make an ally of Russia in the pursuit of her second object,

which was to meet the rise of Germany in the West.

In pursuing the aforesaid aims, Britain realized that Japan had grown too great and powerful to be held in leading-strings in the East. Accordingly, Japan had "to be given her head." She must be allowed to have her way in Asia up to the point where Britain's vital interests were touched, and those vital interests are summed up in one word—India. Accordingly, the second Treaty of Alliance is a bond between Britain and Japan in which, in effect, the former says to the latter: "You recognize and protect my special interests in India and I shall recognize and protect your special interests in Eastern Asia."

In the third treaty, signed July 13, 1911, the preamble is especially significant. It reads as follows: "The Government of Japan and the Government of Great Britain, having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of August 12, 1905, and believing that the revision of that Agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said Agreement, namely:

"A. The consolidation and maintenance of

the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India.

"B. The preservation of the common interests of all the Powers in China by ensuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

"C. The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India and the defence of their special interests in those regions."

It has been said by so competent an authority as Lord Beaconsfield that diplomats speak a language that is only understood by themselves. Indeed, this is nowhere given a better illustration than in these three treaties we are now discussing. For, if in the first treaty preservation of the independence of Korea was given as one of its objects, it would appear that the phrase was inserted because Japan intended to go to war to *destroy* the independence of Korea, and this was known at the time the phrase was written into the treaty. Similarly, if treaties one, two and three each contain assurances that the parties thereto mutually guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China, then the reason of it is to be found in the fact that the parties had in reality mutually agreed that the independence and

territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire was to be the subject of attack. And, indeed, subsequent events demonstrated that such was in fact the intention, when by various acts it became clear that Britain was committed to support Japan's claim of a paramount position in Manchuria and her violation of the principles of the "Open Door" and the integrity of China. Such acts are those we have already enumerated in a previous chapter, namely, Britain's support of the Japanese veto on the Fakumen and Chinchow-Aigun Railway schemes; her recognition and support of Japan's paramount position in Fukien Province; her support of Japan's actions and policy in Shantung, Manchuria and Mongolia.

Britain's insistence upon forcing her own reading of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with reference to the administration of the Panama Canal, coming at the same time as the raising of the Japanese immigration issue in California, was the first sharp reminder America had thus far received that in case of trouble between the United States and Japan the Anglo-Japanese Alliance might apply. Recently, also, has come a realization for the first time that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance really meant something quite different from what its published terms are permitted to disclose. Indeed, the conviction that this is so has been growing upon Americans, until to-day we doubt if any treaty that might be signed between Japan and

Britain would be received by them with anything but profound suspicion and distrust. For it is from conclusions such as we have made above that Americans have come firmly to believe that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance does indeed apply to the United States.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE—THE JAPANESE PERIL

In the pursuit of her main object, namely, to attain the hegemony in the Far East, Japan had, up to 1911, the support of Britain—not freely granted, it is true, for it was a question not of choice but of necessity. In the amended treaty of 1911, Britain, while still retaining in the preamble of the treaty stipulations with respect to her special interests in India, no longer makes mention of India in the body of the treaty, and the treaty was further emasculated by providing that Britain need not come to Japan's assistance in case of attack by a Power with whom she had concluded a treaty of general arbitration. This was inserted in view of the impending treaty of general arbitration between Great Britain and the United States. This partial weakening of the force of the treaty of 1905 meant, in other words, that Britain felt impelled, for certain reasons, to "pour a little water in her wine." The beverage had got to be stronger than was agreeable to the British palate.

One reason for the change lay in the fact that Britain, having made an *entente* with Russia in 1907, had ceased to fear an attack on India from that quarter. Other reasons are to be sought in the growing fear of a too rapid aggrandizement of Japan in China, in which event Britain would simply have destroyed one Frankenstein only to raise up another, and finally Britain, having sensed the approach of a great European war in the not too distant future, recognized the timely need of soothing the rising susceptibilities of America with respect to the objects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its possible future attitude towards the United States.

From her experiences with Japan since the signing of the 1911 treaty, and particularly during the war, Britain perceives that she is probably again face to face with a question not of choice but of necessity. It is a question for her of whether she is to choose the friendship of Japan or the friendship of America. It would seem absolutely impossible, as matters stand now, for her to have the friendship of both of these countries at one and the same time. Accordingly, she must make her choice, and upon that choice, possibly the most momentous one she has ever been called on to make, depends the entire future of the British Empire. Let us examine briefly what is involved in it.

America's foreign policy revolves about two vital

doctrines known as the Monroe Doctrine and the Hay Doctrine. The one involves nothing less than a guarantee of the continued independence, free from foreign interference, of all countries in the Western Hemisphere—Canada included. Similarly, the Hay Doctrine involves nothing less than an obligation to resist any interference with the territorial integrity or independence of China.

Both of these doctrines have been recognized and subscribed to by all the Powers. They have been challenged by Japan alone, and she has given clearly to understand what kind of a doctrine she wants to substitute for these policies. What her idea of a Monroe Doctrine in the Far East is has been shown in Korea, in Manchuria, in Shantung and in other regions of China.

In fact, nothing could be in sharper antithesis to the real Monroe Doctrine than the Japanese interpretation of it in practice. For in China it means that no railway can be built, no mines or other natural resources exploited, except under conditions dictated by Japan; that no foreign loan can be made without the consent of Japan being first obtained and except with Japanese participation; that Japan must be consulted in all important industrial enterprises requiring foreign capital; that Japanese must be employed as political, financial and military advisers in China; that China must consult Japan when she wishes to purchase armaments and must purchase

a majority of such supplies in Japan; that when foreign capital is used to build railways in China, Japanese managers must be employed and traffic rates be fixed so as to give Japanese commodities an advantage over other foreign goods; that supplies used in railways and other utilities in China must be purchased in Japan or through Japanese firms; that Japanese goods entering China shall be given preferential custom rates; that Japanese shall have the right to own lands and reside in all parts of China and not be subject to China's laws; that Japanese must be heads of police in important Chinese cities; that China shall not lease any of her own territories without first consulting Japan; that no contracts to build naval bases or harbour works in China shall be permitted without first obtaining the consent of Japan; that Japan must be consulted when China desires to change her fiscal systems.

Now, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance gives as one of its objects: "The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by ensuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China." And yet, in the face of this provision and of similar provisions contained in treaties with three other Great Powers, Japan has acted in entire disregard thereof, in the manner we have seen, and the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance has

protected her in so doing. In other words, the Hay Doctrine, one of the two main pillars upon which rests American foreign policy, has been wrecked by Japan with Britain's consent.

The question now arises as to what is the importance to America of insisting upon upholding the Hay Doctrine. The importance of the question has a twofold aspect—a material and a moral aspect. On the material side, the chief importance of insisting upon the Hay Doctrine rests in the fact that to allow a neighbour of the United States on the Pacific Ocean, with a much lower standard of living and perhaps a different standard of ethics, to wax so great that eventually it may become a menace to her security, or to grow so strong as to compel the United States to accept its standards of living and ethics in place of her own, would be suicidal to America as a nation. How could America defend her position on the Immigration Question, for example, if at some future time Japan has extended her sway over the immense population and material resources of China? Or how would America be able to defend that other great policy—the Monroe Doctrine—if at some future time Japan, with the greater part of Asia behind her, should insist on some of the South American States, or Mexico, being thrown open to the invasion of the Yellow man?

Morally, the United States has obligations in

this connection of a very far-reaching character. As the exponent of certain phases of Western civilization, such as democracy and liberal institutions; as the champion of liberty, right, justice, free speech, representative institutions, free education and other of the humanities, America cannot afford to abdicate from the high position she has attained in these regards, and more especially not if driven thereto by the representatives of another race, religion and culture.

We have not touched upon the large commercial interests possessed by Americans in the Far East that require to be protected, nor spoken of the protection against Japanese invasion which America owes as a moral duty to the Filipinos, nor of the transcendental importance to American trade and American security that lies in placing an American interpretation in place of a British interpretation upon the terms of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. Nevertheless, all of these questions are bound up with the Eastern Question in some way, and are entitled to be given great weight in any discussion of America's attitude towards a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Since the cessation of hostilities America has learned a great deal about the iniquities of secret treaties. Moreover, she has been filled with an ever-increasing feeling of abhorrence for the measures and manipulations of diplomats who make a treaty say one thing, according to its plain sense,

while meaning a totally different thing according to their interpretation—perhaps the antithesis of what is written and published to the world. There is a well-grounded belief, furthermore, that some of the clearest terms of treaties, as published, are set at naught by secret provisions which are known to none but the parties concerned. Thus, for example, Russia and Japan in 1916 made a treaty for the protection of their interests in China which in effect pointed to the future partition of China between them and which provided that the same should be kept a secret even from their own allies. This treaty was, of course, in complete contravention of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and is an additional proof of Japan's intention to have her own way—with British support if possible, or without it if necessary. Again, Japan is reputed to have been on the point of concluding a secret treaty with Germany in the early summer of 1918 and before the German reverses put an end to a move in this direction. Other examples of double-dealing engaged in by the Great Powers through the medium of secret treaties are the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1917 between France and Britain for the partition of Turkey, in which the interests of their allies, Russia and Italy, went unnoticed; the secret agreements between France and England on the one side, and Japan on the other, in February, 1917, for the support of Japan's claims in Shantung, claims which were

in direct conflict with China's interests, and to obtain a just settlement of which China had been induced to enter the war as the ally of Britain and France; and finally the London Agreement of April 26, 1915, between Italy and Britain, France and Russia, in which the rights of another ally of the Allies, namely, Serbia, were bargained away without the knowledge and consent of such ally. While this list by no means exhausts the roll of perfidious documents which marked the relations of the Allies among themselves, it is large enough to give point to our argument that Americans who have been initiated into such mysteries as these are convinced that political treaties, whatever their pretended objects may be, are not to be regarded in any other wise than with suspicion and distrust. How should they be able to regard an Anglo-Japanese Alliance with any other feelings, when they perceive the manner in which the last treaty between those two countries has been interpreted by Japan, with the acquiescence of Britain? What confidence can they ever again feel in the published announcements with respect to the intentions of such a treaty, when they have seen how such alleged intentions have been made a mockery of in past treaties? How can they believe the assertions of these countries with respect to the absence of secret provisions in their treaties when they perceive how these very nations have "double-

crossed" their own allies in these particulars? Of course, "the answer is in the negative," and both Britain and Japan may rest assured that American public opinion will never again be easily influenced, by the published assertions with respect to treaties like the one now under discussion, to commit their future fortunes to blind trust in the good faith of any nation whatsoever.

America's attitude towards any renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is strengthened by her conviction that her position in the matter has the sympathy and probably the active support of those former auxiliary members of the British Empire, namely, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, who have now been raised by the force of events, according to the pronouncement of General Smuts, to the plane of equal partners in the British Commonwealth. On the question of the new Japanese peril, all of these States stand side by side with the United States, and their influence must necessarily be extended in opposition to so dangerous a policy as that of interlacing their future destiny with that of the Land of the Rising Sun.

One other consideration in this connection deserves mention. According to the statement made by Mr. Balfour two years ago, and reiterated by him in a recent speech (in which he made cynical references to the Council of the League of

Nations as constituting in reality only the Supreme Council of the Allies sitting at Paris), the British Government is not prepared to, or cannot as yet see its way clear to, abandon what is usually called the "balance of power" theory of world politics. In other words, he favours a continuance of the checks-and-balances principle in international relations. By this we presume he must mean that, as against the growing power and strength of the United States, a convenient check lies in supporting the pretensions of Japan.

Thus, for example, what is more natural than for Britain on the Atlantic and Japan on the Pacific to act in concert as Naval Powers against America, whose naval strength in capital ships will surpass that of Britain in 1924, as we are informed by that capital British naval commentator, Archibald Hurd.

Furthermore, there is the question of the American merchant marine. The Atlantic trade of the United States was before the war carried on chiefly by Great Britain and Germany, whilst the Pacific trade was largely in the hands of the Japanese. The United States very naturally desires to recover the shipping trade she has lost from those countries to which she has lost it. The chief obstacle thereto is now Britain, owing to her predominance on the seas. The American maritime policy is therefore necessarily and inevitably anti-British, and Britain, for the first

time in her history, sees herself compelled to witness the rise of a rival Maritime Power without being able to take measures of retaliation, since American raw materials are needed to keep her factories running. If Britain is to lose her old paramountcy in shipbuilding and shipping, what is to be the future of the British Empire? The answer is that much depends on the Empire's power of production. If the British Empire cannot keep pace with America in the power of production, then the United States will in course of time dominate the world, not only in general industrial production, but in shipbuilding and shipping as well.

Indeed, we may find the key to the recent war, as also of the next coming war, in what that distinguished British economist Ellis Barker says [1] about coal and iron. Mr. Barker points out that he who dominates the coal and iron industries dominates the world. Germany, if victorious, says Mr. Barker, would have dominated the world not so much owing to her territorial acquisitions as owing to her acquisition of a monopoly of coal and iron on the continent of Europe. The present age is the age of coal and iron. Modern machinery, modern implements and modern means of locomotion and transport by land and sea are made of steel. *Providence has given the United States not only the bulk of the world's coal, but also*

[1] *Economic Statesmanship*, by J. Ellis Barker.

the bulk of the world's iron. The conclusion he reaches is that Britain went to war to prevent Germany from controlling the bulk of the world's coal and iron; and just so she may have to go to war to prevent America from indulging herself in a monopoly of these products. And Americans are asking themselves if there is any necessary connection between such facts as these and a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE—THE JAPANESE PERIL

WHEN Mr. Ellis Barker states that he who dominates the coal and iron industries dominates the world, we believe that he is stating what is only relatively true. It is surely as important for the existence and prosperity of a nation that it dominate the sources of food supply, whether within its own domains or abroad. Suppose, for example, that the British Isles contained more than half of the world's total supply of coal and iron, what would that fact avail Great Britain in a contest with a foreign foe who should succeed in sinking her transports of food or in blockading her ports? Similarly, one of Germany's greatest economic problems, both before the war and after, has been and is her food supply. And whatever we may think of her efforts to dominate the coal and iron industries, behind that lay the inexorable demands of her rapidly growing population for a sufficient food supply, which she is unable to supply out of her own soil. For even the United States, with an area nearly fifteen times as great

as Germany and a population only little more than 50 per cent. greater, are rapidly approaching the time when they will have little, if any, food for export. The United States have no longer a huge regular surplus of cattle, beef and butter, and before long they may not produce sufficient meat for their domestic requirements. The same thing is true of all breadstuffs, vegetables and fruit. From being the greatest granary in the world, the United States have become the greatest workshop, and according to the census of 1910 the production of the United States manufacturing industries was valued at approximately 20½ billion dollars, whereas the production of the farms came only to 8½ billion dollars, and in the interval the disproportion has grown even greater.

The main reason, aside from the rapid increase of population, for the serious falling off in America's export of food-stuffs, lies in the fact that agriculture is not sufficiently productive, due mainly to a relatively continuous diminution in the rural population devoted to agricultural labours and a flocking thereof to the cities—phenomena which we see repeated, in a more or less degree, in such other great industrial nations as Britain and Germany, and for identical reasons, namely, higher wages and shorter hours in the city, together with more opportunity for amusement.

In the British Isles the bulk of the agricultural land has been abandoned by the plough and has

been turned into grazing land, where rough grass produces only an insignificant quantity of meat, so that the food situation for Great Britain is even a more desperate one than in Germany, where 61 per cent. of the soil is under cultivation for corn crops, as against only 18 per cent. in the former country. From these figures it must be apparent that agriculture in Great Britain is an utterly decayed industry and that the nation is absolutely dependent on foreign supplies for its existence. Indeed, Germany, in normal times, if thrown back entirely on her own resources of food, might, perhaps, just manage to exist, albeit on short rations, whereas Britain in a similar situation would be reduced to absolute starvation.

The relevancy of all these facts and figures to the subject in hand lies in the fact[1] that the next great war, like the last one, will have to be fought over the question of food supply. For from the beginning of history the most vital problems of war and statesmanship have centred about the food supply and the conditions of its distribution to the peoples of the world. No Government, whatever be its form, whether theocratic, plutocratic, autocratic, oligarchic or democratic, could, under any circumstances, long maintain itself in power unless it has managed to solve this funda-

[1] Since this was written the writer's view has been confirmed by an address delivered at Princeton College by Sir Auckland Geddes, British Ambassador at Washington.

mental problem of the food supply, and it is of the very essence of government that it should be concerned with this problem before it is able to concern itself with any other question. It was the knowledge of this fact on the part of the Allied Governments that caused them to make use of the blockade after the armistice to bring pressure to bear upon Germany for the enforcing of the armistice terms. For it was in response to that pressure that the German Government gave up some of its dearest possessions—its ships, its gold, its rolling stock, its coal and its cattle. Only by making these sacrifices was it possible for Germany to secure the one needful thing—food. And it is from this terrible example that the nations of the world have learned to prize anew the control of the sources of food supply.

Accordingly, with the certain elimination of the United States, in the near future, as a source of food supply, it becomes necessary for a nation like Britain, which has for so many decades drawn the bulk of her provisions from abroad, to look about her and take stock of what other possible sources of food supply she may avail herself if she is to keep her people from starvation. And such stock-taking results in disclosing, as such sources, firstly Russia, and secondly the South American countries. We do not exclude other possibilities from this calculation, as, for example, Canada and Australia, but we are limiting

the subject to its rough outlines only, in which minor factors can make no appreciable change.

We have, then, on the one hand, Germany, who will in time to come be compelled to become a formidable competitor for the harvests of Russia, in which her geographical situation, to say nothing of other factors, gives her great advantages. We have, on the other hand, the United States, which are also destined to become a competitor not only for the harvests of Russia, but for the harvests of the South American countries. Her geographical position and the Monroe Doctrine give her an advantage in the latter countries. And now comes Japan, whose agricultural production is also said to be reaching its limit and demands a "look-in" in the countries which are to provide the future world supply of food.

How are all of these claims to be met without war? That is the question which henceforth is to strain the thinking powers of these leading nations of the world until such time as the genius of man shall have evolved a new solution for an age-old problem. For there will be involved in this problem the fate of China, the stability of the Monroe Doctrine, the balance of power in the Pacific Ocean, and the question of the new Japanese or Yellow peril. So far as concerns the international balance of power formerly existing in the Far East, that has already been destroyed through the reactions of the Great War. What

is to take its place? Constructive statesmanship alone can supply the answer. And constructive statesmanship demands first of all the settlement of the problems of the war on the basis of right and justice. It demands that no nation be punished for the fault of its rulers, and that the spirit of hatred and revenge between former belligerents shall give place to sympathy and good will. There must come a recognition of the fact that no peace can be permanent which does not take into consideration the fact that for a nation to seek for and accept political advantage out of the recent war, as so many have done since the cessation of hostilities, is to make the sacrifice of some of the noblest lives humanity has had to offer a matter of trade and barter. It is to deceive the very bone and sinew of the nations with promises that are cashed in by the unworthy who are left behind. It is a wrong to the peoples and a wrong to the State, for in the growing intelligence of the masses of the people there will grow up a determination that they will never permit their leaders to deceive them again and to make of their sacrifices a ladder upon which to climb to undeserved heights of glory, where the joy of the victors can be measured only by the misery of their victims. Such thoughts as these will awaken the peoples to the realization that their liberties are in jeopardy—not from without, but from within the State. For they will have understood that

the war has not settled the struggle for a really democratic world, but that in reality it has served to strengthen and rejuvenate the forces of reaction and to engraft upon the body politic the "balance of power" system for another epoch.

The chief importance of the League of Nations idea lay in the fact that it would have provided, if properly organized, an international body which could have taken in hand the absolutely vital question of the future equitable distribution of the world's supplies of food and raw materials. It would be idle to talk of disarmament until such an organization had been founded, with its Supreme Economic Council given authority and power to regulate such distribution for the entire world. In the prosecution of its work, such an Economic Council would encounter great, perhaps insuperable, obstacles. There is, for example, the question of the various standards of living. Under pre-war standards it is estimated that ten Japanese can live on what one American consumes and five Japanese upon what one German consumes. Accordingly, the absorption by one section of the human family of what might be considered more than its due share of food products might lead to difficulties. Indeed, the main cause of Australia's, as of America's, opposition to Japanese immigration is an economic one. The Australian and American worker, with his high standard of living, cannot compete with the

Japanese, with his much lower standard. And similarly the Japanese Government excludes the Chinese from the Island Empire because the Chinese have a still lower standard than the Japanese, and to admit them in large numbers would greatly handicap the Japanese workman and throw him out of employment.

The problem in South American countries is essentially the same as it is in the countries we have just mentioned. So long as the Monroe Doctrine is upheld, they may retain their present standard of living. But what if a European nation like Russia, or an Asiatic nation like Japan, were to invade and annex any of those countries? There can be no doubt that their standard of living would undergo an immediate lowering.

To go more deeply into this subject would only carry us too far afield. It is our purpose to discuss the matter no further than is necessary to show the inevitable connection of these questions with the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Such an alliance can only be regarded in the future as a menace to the stability not only of the United States, but of Australia, Canada and the South American States. For the alliance of a State possessing a high standard of living with a State possessing a low standard can only result in the long run in effecting a lowering of standard in the former, and finally in imposing a lower standard of living upon the victims of their

opposition and attack, if they chance to be, not Chinese or Indians, but Australians or Americans.

Indeed, it is this fundamental problem of the food supply and of the wide variance between the standards of living of the European, American and Australian on the one hand, and the Japanese and other Asiatics on the other hand, which makes it imperatively necessary for the European, the American and the Australian to stand together, as it were, against a common foe. We do not mean that Europe and America should unite to keep Asia in subjection. By no means. But the Asiatics should be permitted to work out their own destinies, and every interference or intervention by Westerns in attempting to control or direct those destinies must necessarily result in the end in making the peoples of the West accept the lower and more servile standards of the East.

If, for example, Asia, which means Japan, and Great Britain should join hands in the organization of any future Supreme Economic Council of a League of Nations, they would, perhaps, be in a position to dominate its decisions. The world shortage of food and other raw materials would then be set forth as due to the selfish consumption by the Americas and Australasia of more than their share thereof, or to a refusal on their part to share their unoccupied lands with others who require their use for the production of food and the development of other natural resources. In such

a contingency and upon such an issue, Britain and Japan would naturally have the sympathy and support of every nation in the world that suffered from a similar shortage. And particularly of all those nations, colonies and dominions, like the African, which have been or will hereafter be erected out of tribes, races and nationalities that possess a low standard of living, since those with the low standard must assuredly profit by reducing the consumption of the high standard nations.

Britain and France betrayed what may be regarded as almost a fatal weakness when they made use of their coloured subject races to fight their battles for them in a conflict between two groups of highly civilized white nations. Able authorities on the subject of the Black Continent and the coloured races, like E. D. Morel, foresee the most serious consequences to the future of white civilization from this misuse of subject coloured races in the white man's armies. They believe that it will surely affect the white man's security in Africa, and eventually his security in Europe as well. Indeed, judging from the analogies of past history, the Senegalese must some day rule in Paris and the Bengalese or the Punjabi in London.

Be that as it may, certainly harm has been done, and this is spoken in no spirit of race prejudice, and still more harm will be done if this working together of white with coloured races, having a

totally different standard and point of view with respect to the humanities and modes of living, is allowed to develop to the point where two such allies can unite in a common purpose against a common foe. Indeed, we should regard it as just as great a betrayal of race if the Japanese should consent to aid the British in suppressing an Indian uprising as would be British consent to aid the Japanese in upsetting the Monroe Doctrine in a war against America. Neither of these contingencies ought to be so much as even thinkable, and surely nothing could more positively foreshadow the decline and fall of the British Empire, if not of all Western civilization, than would either of these eventualities, if it should come to pass. For the world would be divided against itself, and could no more survive under such conditions than could the Union, under Lincoln, "half slave, half free."

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS

LOOKING forward, at the close of the Great War, it would seem to the thoughtful observer that the greatest political problem which the Western nations have to solve outside their own boundaries is the question of how to avoid a future race conflict in the East. As the writer has already pointed out, it is one of the probabilities that have to be reckoned with that Japanese Militarism and Imperialism must sooner or later call such a race conflict into being, unless steps are taken by the Western Powers to check the current of the stream before it has become a torrent. An avalanche is a wonderful thing to witness from afar, but let us beware of being caught in one.

Wise statesmanship will decree that a coalition composed of America, Britain, Germany and Russia is the soundest proposal that can be made if we are really in earnest in seeking a means of defeating the plans that are being brewed to overturn and overwhelm the Western world-order. Western civilization were well advised to have

no illusions on the subject. For, unless a higher statesmanship is exhibited than has hitherto been shown in the settlement of the terms of Peace, the West will once again see an Attila leading his hordes into their capitals and quartering his beasts in the pews of their cathedrals. And when that time comes, there may perhaps be some survivors of a cultured and literary turn of mind who will ruefully recall Macaulay's clairvoyant and prophetic words about the traveler from New Zealand who would one day, in the midst of a great solitude, take his stand on a broken arch of London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St. Paul's.

The League of Nations as at present constituted will never be the effective instrument its authors intended it to be. That is to say, "its authors" who, like General Smuts and Lord Robert Cecil, really had a vision of a better world when they advocated and championed a set of principles which were to have embraced all mankind in their scope. Their failure to secure the acceptance of those broader ideals set its seal upon the instrument as it finally emerged from the Council Chamber of the "Big Five." It was the seal of doom, and the opportunity to benefit mankind unto the farthest ages by making one sweeping gesture to eliminate the seeds of war will not recur again, perhaps, for centuries. Accordingly, there remains but one effective weapon which the West may employ to save us

from that "sea of troubles" towards which our statesmen are more or less blindly conducting us. There must be Russia, with her far-flung territory reaching to the Pacific, who must erect the outer dykes to stem the devastating floods of the Yellow races when they begin to move. And Russia must in turn be supported by the arms and industry of Germany, for Russia's most vulnerable flank must be secure in the event of such a race struggle. America and England must, of course, hold the seas and keep open the trade routes of the world in so far as it is necessary to secure the victory.

But the real purpose of the coalition would be to promote a political and diplomatic course of action which will render a conflict unnecessary. And to do so they must first clear their own decks for action and put their own homes in order. That is to say, that preliminary to any united action on the part of the nations named there must first come a thoroughgoing revision of the Treaties of Versailles and St.-Germain and a satisfactory solution of the Russian, Turkish, Persian, Egyptian, Indian and Irish questions.

A combination of the four Powers named would be in a position to take in hand the reorganization of the Chinese Republic and to offer successful opposition to the intrigues and aggressive tactics of the Japanese in the Far East. First and foremost, however, in this new orienta-

tion of the four Powers must be a scrupulous regard and respect for the interests of China. By pursuing such a course they will, in time, discover, not only that it is "more blessed to give than to receive," but also that to him who comes laden with gifts more material rewards are rendered than to him who comes armed with a blunderbuss, prepared only to rob and despoil. To effect any lasting and beneficent results, they must come prepared to surrender their spheres of influence, their Treaty Ports and their Boxer indemnities. Only thus can the confidence and trust of the Chinese nation in the Western Powers be restored. Only thus may the Powers expect to win the sympathy of the Chinese people to their aims. And as a corollary to these steps, the four Powers must see to it that all leases and agreements, in which, of course, are included the Chino-Japanese secret agreements of 1915 and 1918, shall be abrogated in order that China may at last be restored to full sovereignty in Manchuria, Mongolia and Shantung. Other reforms will include the abolition of extra-territoriality, which deprives the Chinese courts of legal jurisdiction over the foreigner, and the right of China to fix her own tariff dues. Financially, the Republic must be assisted to her feet by taking in hand a reorganization of the finances of the realm and by making loans at a reasonable rate of interest and upon reasonable conditions, the

same to be devoted to the restoration and revival of China's industrial and economic processes. As much technical and expert assistance as is required for the attainment of these ends must be generously offered, without, however, in any manner depriving the Chinese themselves of the actual control. Similarly, the unification and extension of China's transport and communication system must be taken in hand in order that all parts of the commonwealth may be bound together in one central organization whose administrative and executive acts shall reach to and be respected in the remotest regions of the State.

Among Chinese statesmen of pre-eminence who have given much thought to the subject under discussion is Liang Chi-Chao, whose conclusions with respect to what is needful for the reform of China must be followed by every enlightened and impartial critic. Indeed, no student of Chinese affairs can afford to disregard the thoughts of this wise and patriotic Chinese author and statesman, who has devoted his life to the cause of progress in his native land.

Liang Chi-Chao's participation in Chinese affairs goes back to the year 1898, at which time began the first real assertion of progressive influence in modern China. The late Emperor, Kuang-Hsu, had summoned around him men who held advanced views, chief among whom was Kang-Yu-wei, the "modern sage," as he was

known to his countrymen. At the instigation of this truly remarkable man the young Emperor issued a series of enlightened edicts which, could they have been carried into execution, would have revolutionized the national polity. A Court cleavage was the immediate sequel. Then followed the memorable *coup d'état* which gave the Dowager-Empress supreme power and reduced her well-meaning nephew, the Emperor, to the position of a puppet. Among the prominent leaders in the new movement was Liang Chi-Chao. Some of his associates were put to death for their part in the movement, and Liang escaped a similar fate by taking flight to Japan.

Liang Chi-Chao now devoted himself in other ways to the uplift of his country. In the religious thought of his countrymen he saw much that required purification, and accordingly we find him directing his efforts to bring Chinese Buddhism back to the older, purer form of worship and thought and freed from superstitious and unscientific accessories which had clung about the faith in the long centuries of its observance. Moreover, by rendering Western works in science and literature accessible to the Chinese, Liang Chi-Chao and some of his co-workers have done great service. By dint of hard labour, Liang became in time the most important literary exponent of Chinese nationalism. In his historical work, he caused Chinese history to be

studied in the schools in a critical and scientific manner.

More recently, Liang Chi-Chao has devoted his extraordinary talents to political writing; primarily, preaching the doctrines of constitutional government and representative institutions, but in general seeking to introduce the public mind to the thought of the world.

Such, in brief, is the man whose political views and insight have attained to such influence on the Chinese nation and according to whom China's misfortunes are to be attributed to the policy of intervention employed by the foreign Powers ever since the occupation of Hong Kong by the English in 1842, followed by the French in Annam and Tongking in 1885, by the Germans in Tsingtao and the Russians in the Liao-tung Peninsula in 1898, and by the Japanese in South Manchuria in 1905. Each one of these interventions became the provocation for still others, and the list we have given is far from complete. Accordingly, with such conflicting elements grazing one another in China in every direction, it cannot be wondered at that in course of time there have evolved innumerable causes of strife, discord and dissension among the Powers concerned; and one has only to read an impartial account of what occurred among the European Powers represented at Peking during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and the siege of the Legations to perceive that the

feelings and antagonisms then aroused already carried the seeds of a general world conflict, which, in reality, broke loose only fourteen years later. These seeds of conflict will continue to exist, so Liang Chi-Chao believes, just so long as the Powers continue their present policy of interference and intervention.

The cure lies, says Liang, in the complete restoration to China of all the territory of which she has been despoiled since first she had to do with the foreigner from the West in the early years of the Victorian era. At the very least, China should be restored to the *status quo* existing prior to the date of the Chino-Germanic lease agreement of March 6, 1898. "Then," says Liang, "China will gladly place all her treasures at the disposal of all the world, will abandon her obstructive tactics, and rescind the laws which now embarrass the trade of foreigners in the interior. If, however, these reforms are not carried out, then will China constitute a menace to the peace of the world."

Nor is the programme of reforms which are to put China in a position to devote herself to her nobler tasks in the world to be regarded as completed with the restoration of the leased territories. In addition thereto, Liang demands the complete liberation of China from foreign influences, the annulment of existing treaties, a reform of the tariff, cancellation of the Boxer in-

demnities, abolition of the extra-territorial rights and other special privileges enjoyed by foreigners, rescission of the 1915 and 1918 Agreements with Japan, and a reorganization of the Chinese railways.

It is of importance that foreign interests should reach a recognition of the fact that the programme of reforms thus promulgated and championed by Liang Chi-Chao is one that has the support and approval not only of the most authoritative elements in China's public life, but likewise of the masses of the people. Nor should the fact be lost sight of that, with all his patriotism, Liang would probably be among the first to advocate a union with Japan, or at least the acceptance of Japanese leadership and a tentative agreement submitting to Japanese administrative control for a term of years, provided the Western Powers fail to accord China a timely concurrence in her just demands. In the latter possible event, assuming that the nation follows Liang's lead, all the elements for a future race conflict will have been gathered together, and the consequences thereof will not take long in making themselves felt upon the Western nations.

There are those who profess to believe that the raising of the cry "Save China!" is merely a new form of camouflaged Western hypocrisy, seeking to advance selfish interests under the guise of a new crusade for right and justice.

This would be true if the Western nations now intervene in the affairs of China without first offering to make the sacrifices which are absolutely essential if the situation is to be saved. The writer would not favour, much less advocate, the exclusion of Japan from participation in the internal affairs of China, if he did not at the same time advocate exclusion of the other Powers as well. There is no question here of ill-will towards Japan and of complacent advocacy of the so-called "superior rights" of the Western nations. On the contrary, there can be no doubt that the Western nations have no superior rights here. But it has been the writer's purpose to show in the preceding pages that Japan, likewise, has no superior rights, and that all the advantages she requires in order to promote the happiness and prosperity of the Japanese may be obtained without extending Japanese sovereignty over vast regions on the Asiatic Continent at the expense of the Chinese and other neighbouring peoples. It has been shown that Japan can make no use of these outlying regions for colonization purposes, because the Japanese, like the French, may own colonies but they are not a colonizing race. Nor is the plea of over-population a good one when we compare the population and area of the Japanese Empire with the population and area of such densely populated countries as the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and France. Japan's

need for raw materials, particularly coal and iron, can be supplied in China without going to the length of depriving the Chinese of territory and independence. Moreover, if Japan's reasons for seeking further expansion on the Asiatic Continent are sound, then no country in the world can be considered safe from the rapacity of its neighbours and the whole world must remain an armed camp. To save the peoples from such a fate will be the highest task of our statesmen in the coming years, and they will have only half accomplished their labours if they save Europe and neglect Asia. For we are in accord with those "people in East and West, in the Old World and the New, who are convinced that the only hope of better things is in a constant striving to bring better understanding between the races; and that the West cannot be free unless the East is made free too."

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

AMERICA FACES THE NEW WORLD SITUATION

THE outbreak of the Great War in 1914 saw no country in the world, not even China, so unprepared to face its consequences as was the United States. Ever since the close of the Civil War in 1865, the subject of war was one which had grown to have but the merest academic interest for Americans, and with the exception of the Spanish-American War of 1898, a war of such small dimensions as scarcely to deserve the name of a national conflict, nothing had occurred in half a century to arouse America to any real sense of danger of attack from without, or to diminish in any sensible degree the sense of security which came from her geographical position of isolation. And even after the hurricane broke loose in the summer of 1914, the great mass of Americans continued to believe, for at least two years longer, in the possibility of being able to pursue their peaceful pursuits without having to take much thought for what was going on beyond their boundaries.

Many causes contributed to this detached way

of looking at foreign affairs, aside from the important fact of geographical isolation. Traditionally, Americans had been warned to hold themselves aloof from European entangling alliances and from foreign disputes generally. Militarism was a thing unknown on the Western Hemisphere. Americans, whatever their native combative instincts or fighting spirit might be, had seen their country grow to become the richest and most prosperous among the nations by the arts of peace. Providence had blessed the United States with abundance. Among the nations of the world she was the largest producer of corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco, pigs, mules, fish, fruit, coal, iron, copper, zinc, lead, petroleum, natural gas, timber and many other products. She was second to none in her wonderful system of free education, and her success had been due not alone to the possession of vast natural resources, but to the unexampled energy and foresight of her leaders and to the inborn gifts, the acquired abilities and character of the people. Psychologically a people possessed of a strange mixture of commercialism and idealism, Americans, within their limited horizon, became a nation, for a large part devoted to a humanitarian pacifism. They did not covet their neighbour's goods, and their idealism prevented them from believing that any neighbour could ever harbour contrary sentiments towards themselves.

But whatever the causes may be, it is certain that here was one of the cleverest and most intelligent nations of the world, who regarded foreign affairs in a manner quite as detached and quite as academical as did the Chinese up to the year 1900, when at last, after suffering many humiliations at his hands, the nation was roused to offer resistance to the foreigner, and to make an attempt, however futile, to free the country from the yoke of foreign interference.

When the storm broke, and for more than two years thereafter, the attitude of the United States, in its physical weakness, its unpreparedness, its indecision, its flabby foreign policy, was indeed a humiliating spectacle. In the Pacific the American merchant marine had been swept from the board by Congressional legislation which created a set of conditions making it impossible to compete with foreign lines. Honolulu, the Philippines and Guam were in a state of half-defence, the Navy concentrated in the Atlantic and prevented from sending quick relief to Pacific stations by reason of the filling up of the Panama Canal at Culebra; no ships were available for munitions to the outlying possessions; the Government itself had been struck by panic, in which the State Department lost its chief, William J. Bryan, and its ablest adviser, Professor John Bassett Moore; the War Department suffering similarly in the resignation of Secretary Garrison, by general

acknowledgment the ablest man in the Wilson Cabinet; and the Navy likewise having to endure the serious loss of one of its ablest Admirals, Fiske, who resigned because of differences with his superiors. Not content with providing the world this picture of absolute consternation, Congress now proceeded to heap fuel upon the flames by taking up for consideration an Act for abandoning the Philippines, and the Bill actually passed one Chamber of the Legislature.

Thus America was playing a sorry part during a period when she saw her neighbour on the opposite side of the Pacific developing and exhibiting all the traits of strength, preparedness and efficiency in which she herself was so sadly lacking. She saw Japan setting forces in motion that would include the fate of the Asiatic Continent in the course and outcome of the conflict and which would involve American position and prestige in the Orient. America beheld with amazement the promptness with which, a few days after hostilities commenced, Baron Kato, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, announced in the Diet that Japan was prepared to assume her obligations under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. With still more amazement, America perceived Japan blocking China's proposal to neutralize all territory leased to foreign nations, a solution which would have obviated Japan's declaration of war on Germany to obtain possession of Kiao-

chow, and delivering an ultimatum to Germany on August 15th, followed by a declaration of war on August 24th. Nor was America's astonishment in any wise decreased by the subsequent steps taken by the Government at Tokio. The efficient naval and military demonstrations at Kiao-chow were followed by administrative steps taken in the interior of Shantung, the seizing of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railroad, the taking over of the customs, by numerous acts regulating the internal affairs of the province, and all of this culminated finally in the presentation of the twenty-one demands on China in January 1915.

These occurrences, involving as they did the undermining of solemnly contracted treaties and the repudiation of Japan's promises, were slowly turning the light on Japan's real attitude towards America. They showed a realization on Japan's part of America's weakness and a purpose to profit by it. Nor did the Tokio Government confine itself to veiled threats.

Soon after the war began, Japan sent a strong fleet to cruise in the Pacific, although she had stated that her naval operations would be confined to Chinese waters. Not only was the Japanese fleet found to be cruising in American waters, but it is believed that attempts were made to obtain a coaling station in Mexican territory on the coast of Lower California. The Japanese battleship *Asama* went aground there

in December 1914, in Turtle Bay, and it did not add to the sense of security, of which the American people now began to feel the lack, when they were informed that it was three months before the United States learned definitely of the situation of the *Asama* so near to her own coasts. By that time other Japanese war-vessels had assembled, ostensibly to assist the *Asama* from her perilous position. Thus the situation remained until June 1915, with the American battle fleet concentrated in the Atlantic and unable to use the Panama Canal for a swift movement into the Pacific, and in the meantime the twenty-one demands had been imposed upon China against the paper protest of the United States. If it was pure madness, as some have asserted, for Japan to make these bellicose gestures in the face of Uncle Sam at just this particular time, there surely was method in it.

Thus America saw the new Asia growing up before her eyes—a new Asia in which the system of checks and balances, which had formerly existed to keep the most predatory Powers in check, had now been superseded by the omnipotent power of Japan. If there was any doubt with respect to Russia's future position there, it was soon removed with the outbreak of the Revolution in March 1917. This was the finishing touch that put America in a position where she would have to face an entirely new set of world

forces in the future, both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific. For there surely could have been no illusions with respect to America's future position in the Atlantic after the old European balance of power had been destroyed by victory over Germany. Such a victory meant that Britain's naval power was set free to pursue the aims of the British Government in any part of the world without having to fear an attack upon her flank on the part of a powerful continental nation. It meant that if complications ensued between the United States and Japan, Britain would be in a position to take sides against America. It meant that America would have to vie with Britain in naval strength, because otherwise the principle for which America primarily stands in her foreign diplomacy, of peaceful penetration of foreign markets, with equal opportunities for all, could not be upheld against a nation that held command of the seas. Involved in this principle were America's most cherished Monroe Doctrine and her Hay Doctrine. These tenets of American foreign policy had not hitherto lain at the mercy of Britain, because Britain had been forced to have regard for her continental enemies. Now she was not only America's leading trade competitor, but likewise the dominating factor upon the seas, and as such she could open and close the doors of trade to her leading trade rival entirely at her own

sweet will. The numerous notes of protest which the American State Department presented to the British Foreign Office during the war demonstrated effectually that in time of war the rules of international law are treated with as scanty respect by the British as the Germans showed for the neutrality of Belgium. It is the unmolested right of a neutral to trade, within certain recognized limits, whether with belligerents or with other neutrals, that has constituted a ground of policy of American statesmanship that dates back to the Napoleonic wars. Thence arises America's championing of the principle known as "the freedom of the seas." And with the development of the new methods of warfare at sea, whereby merchantmen may now be attacked not only on the surface, but likewise from the air and from beneath the waters, the doctrine of "the freedom of the seas" is an even greater necessity than it has been in the past, when trading merchantmen could protect themselves more or less successfully from raiders and privateers. Thus the United States, if she cannot by reason of newly acquired naval strength compel the recognition and acceptance of the "freedom of the seas" principle, will see her entire foreign trade jeopardized in any war of broad dimensions between naval Powers. It is a principle that every maritime nation in the world, except one, has had an interest in supporting.

This fact alone is indicative of how disadvantageous it is to the world at large for one Power to have such predominance upon the seas that the combined interests of all the rest of the world cannot force her to recede from her position.

To summarize the situation, America now perceives herself on one front opposite to Japan, which is now predominant in Asia, and on the other front she stands face to face with Britain, which is now predominant in Europe. And these two nations, Britain and Japan, are known to have common designs, partly set forth in a Treaty of Alliance and partly secret, as numerous disclosures since August 1914 have made clear to the world.

Indeed, the peace of the world will continue to be threatened so long as any Power or combination of Powers, be it Britain alone, Britain and France, Britain and Japan, or Britain, France and Japan, may impose their will on the commerce and industry of other nations or by unfair regulations make an attempt to seize their markets. Every nation whose industrial development results in pressure outward into foreign commerce must be rendered secure against hostile measures of any Power or Powers whose right to enforce such measures rests purely upon superior force or upon a superior balance of forces. The danger from great militaristic adventures upon the land, such as we saw in the recent war, has been broken for

the time being, and it will continue to remain broken only in the event that the equally hateful danger of navalism upon the high seas shall be extinguished.

A close analysis of the causes of the recent war must lead inevitably to the conclusion that the fear of militarism which existed on the one side was matched by the fear of navalism on the other side. Fear of militarism meant fear of the pronouncedly superior advantages in industrial competition possessed by a nation which, like Germany, could gain control of the bulk of Europe's coal and iron. Fear of navalism, on the other hand, meant fear of the blockade, fear of starvation, fear of exclusion from the sources of the world's food supplies, fear of insecurity to trade, so long as one great naval Power could set at defiance the universal demand for acceptance of the principle of "the freedom of the seas."